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News NY 1st Dept: Plaintiff's Testimony Alone As To Lighting Insufficient To Defeat SJ November 10, 2009 < Back Share to: In Brodie v. Gibco Enterprises, Ltd., the plaintiff, a patron in the defendant’s restaurant, tripped and fell on a single step that separated the bar from the dining area. The plaintiff claimed that the lighting in the bar area was inadequate. The restaurant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the area above the step was lit by a recessed lighting fixture in the ceiling and that the step neither was inherently dangerous nor constituted a hidden trap. The lower court granted the defendant’s motion and the plaintiff appealed. In affirming the decision, the First Department found that the plaintiff's testimony alone, without any other admissible evidence as to the sufficiency of the lighting or the inherent danger of the step could not defeat summary judgment. Thanks to Ed Lomena for his contribution to this post. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_07930.htm Previous Next Contact

News Three Strikes and You’re Out on Coverage: COVID-19 Business Interruption Claim Fails (PA) December 18, 2020 < Back Share to: Of course, COVID-19 and accompanying shutdown orders impact on business interruption claims are still among the most pressing issues facing the courts. In Toppers Salon & Health Spa Inc v Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has provided one of the most definitive answers on the issue with its rejection of an insured’s business interruption claim. Plaintiff Toppers operates a chain of day spas in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, all of which have been affected by government mandated shutdown orders. Toppers’ insurance policy covers interruption to its business which includes business income coverage and civil authority coverage. The key provision in the policy here is that it covers loss “due to the necessary suspension of your ‘operations’ during the ‘period of restoration,’” if the suspension was “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at [the insured's] premises.” “The ‘Civil Authority’ provision covers loss of Business Income and extra expenses incurred due to damage to property other than property at the insured's premises, when as a result of ‘dangerous physical conditions,’ a civil authority's actions prohibit access to both the insured's premises and the area immediately surrounding the damaged property.” The Court held that neither of these provisions applied in this case deciding that being forced to close as a result of the shutdown orders was not a “physical loss.” The language the Court primarily focused on was the period for which the policy would reimburse a loss. The policy provided that this period ended on the “date when the property at the described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced.” The Court opined that for this language to make sense, a physical loss must have occurred to be repaired, and the shutdown order did not meet this definition. The Court believed the policy language demonstrated the intent of the parties that any loss must be some sort of physical damage. The Civil Authority coverage did not apply because, similarly, a physical loss had not occurred to neighboring property. The Court also looked at the specific Virus Exclusion holding Plaintiff would also lose its claim for coverage because of its plain language as well. The Virus Exclusion applies to “loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus ... that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.” The Court held that, “The language is not ambiguous, and it applies to Covid-19, which is caused by a coronavirus that causes physical illness and distress.” The Court held that similar language was held to exclude coverage in South Dakota and California. This opinion is one of the strongest yet to deny coverage for businesses forced to close due to government shutdown orders during the COVID-19 pandemic. A clear Virus Exclusion is one way for insurance companies to be sure that they will not be required to cover for these types of losses, but this Court went further, holding that COVID-19 is not a physical loss that could be covered by a business interruption or civil authority coverage. While courts will still wrestle for the time being as to how exactly COVID-19 and insurance overlap, this Court strongly casted its vote in favor of the lack of coverage camp. Thanks to Ryan Geib for his contribution to this post. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Thomas Bracken. Previous Next Contact

News Trial Court Slip Up: A Jury Charge For The Ongoing Storm Doctrine May 31, 2024 < Back Share to: The “slip and fall” might be the quintessential lawsuit, and beyond that it is a lawsuit that comes in more than one flavor; wet-floor, icy condition, debris, etc. The ice and snow variety is particularly noteworthy in the northern part of the United States, where winter temperatures can lead to icy conditions and storms that last for prolonged periods of time. This all begs the question, how does one defend against a slip and fall lawsuit due to icy conditions? Though any lawsuit’s defenses will depend on the circumstances of the case, the Superior Court of New Jersey, appellate division recently ruled on an appeal touching on one of the issues of winter weather and New Jersey’s ongoing storm rule. In Gallardo v. Walmart , No. A-2336-22, 2024 WL 2003372, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 7, 2024), plaintiff Gallardo slipped and fell at a Walmart in Union, New Jersey. Id . Prior to that winter, defendant Walmart had hired Land Pros of New Jersey, LLC (“Land Pros”) as an ice and snow contractor, which “typically used a salt-spreading snowplow truck, front-end loader, and had a shed on-site with shovels and bagged deicing agent. At two inches of snow accumulation, Land Pros would plow and provide ‘salt services as needed.’” Id . Land Pros cleared the parking lot the day before Gallardo fell, and though there was no snow on the parking lot in the morning of the day of Gallardo’s fall, “by late morning “sleet, snow, and rain began to fall and continued until 3:00 p.m., and it mainly continued to rain through the evening and night.” Id . After both sides had presented evidence, Walmart “requested the court tailor the jury charge to include language regarding the ongoing storm doctrine. Id . at *3. In New Jersey, the law is that a property owner or business does not have to remove snow or ice from the property until a reasonable amount of time after the storm ends. In this case, the evidence shows that ... [p]laintiff slipped in the roadway during an ongoing snowstorm. There is an exception to this rule that you have to consider. A commercial landowner may be liable if their actions increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees of their property, for example, by creating unusual circumstances where the defendant's conduct exacerbate[s] and increase[s] the risk of injury to the plaintiff. In this case, ... [p]laintiff claims that when Walmart's snow contractor applied salt on the ground, during the snowstorm, an unusual circumstance was created, that increased the risk that pedestrians would fall. Walmart denies that the application of an ice melting agent, during a snowstorm, created an unusual circumstance, which increased inherent hazards to pedestrians, like ... [p]laintiff. Id . The Trial court declined to include the proposed charge and the jury was charged on “general negligence principles, including negligence and ordinary care, foreseeability, and duties owed to invitees.” Id . Walmart objected to the lack of a charge about the ongoing storm doctrine, but the Trial Court “declined to include language regarding the ongoing storm doctrine because ‘it would bring confusion into the jury in the [c]ourt's view.’” Id . The jury issued a verdict in favor of Gallardo totaling $1,127,941 which the Trial Court ultimately molded to $1,328,658.59. Id . Additionally, the Trial Court “denied Walmart’s subsequent motion for a new trial, judgement notwithstanding the verdict, or remitter.” Id . In response to the verdict, Walmart filed an appeal, and argued that “trial judge should have instructed the jury on—or considered when adjudicating its pre- and post-trial motions—the ongoing storm doctrine” adopted in Pareja v. Princeton International Properties , 246 N.J. 546 (2021). Id . Moreover, Walmart argued that the “the exceptions to the ongoing storm doctrine did not exist here.” Id . at *4. Walmart asserts the court improperly denied its motion for summary judgment because Land Pros was granted summary judgment based on the ongoing storm doctrine. The court's ruling on Walmart's motion was contrary to the law of the case and it cannot be held liable for the negligent retention of Land Pros where Land Pros was not found to be negligent. Id . Walmart also argued that the Trial Court judge “erred when he refused to charge the jury on Pareja and the ongoing storm doctrine” and Walmart noted that the Trial Court “judge based his decision on the lack of a model jury charge, but this did not justify declining to charge the jury on the applicable law.” Id . The Appellate Court reviewed the case law for Pareja , including the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holdings that “commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of a storm” and that “it is categorically inexpedient and impractical to remove or reduce hazards from snow and ice while the precipitation is ongoing.” Id . at *5. Further, the Appellate Court took into account the New Jersey Supreme Court’s note that “‘unusual circumstances may give rise to a duty before’ the conclusion of a storm” including “two exceptions to the no-duty rule for commercial landowners during ongoing storms.” Id . The upshot of the Appellate Court’s review was that it decided that the Trial Court did not err “when it denied Walmart’s pre-trial summary judgment motion under the ongoing storm doctrine.” Id . This was because the Appellate Court determined that while summary judgment is “only proper where ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law’” in this case “there was a genuine dispute whether Walmart’s conduct, through its contractor Land Pros, made the parking lot more dangerous on the day of the accident.” Id . However, the Appellate Court also stated that the model jury instructions have been revised since Pareja and “now account for the ongoing storm doctrine.” Id . Simply put, the “trial judge should have instructed the jury on the ongoing storm doctrine.” Id . at *6. By way of explanation, the Appellate Court stated that: We part ways with the judge's view that charging the jury on the doctrine would have confused them. The doctrine does not establish a blanket no-duty rule and has two clear exceptions, which are not beyond the ken of the average juror. The jury should have had the option to consider whether Walmart's conduct “ ‘exacerbate[d] or increase[d] the risk’ of injury to ... plaintiff,” or whether the application of the deicing agent was a normal circumstance of an ongoing storm. Id . The judgment was accordingly vacated and remanded for a new trial, with instruction that if “the matter is re-tried, the court shall instruct the jury using the revised model charge on the ongoing-storm doctrine as a starting point.” Id . While it is indeed possible that this particular case might proceed to another trial, as to the issue of charging a jury on the ongoing storm doctrine, it is likely that property owners, managers, and contractors, will likely sit up and take notice of the Appellate Court’s ruling. Gallardo v. Walmart .pdf Download PDF • 184KB Previous Next Ryan Hunsicker Ryan Hunsicker Senior Associate +1 267 239 5526 rhunsicker@wcmlaw.com Contact

News NJ Reinforces Litgation Privilege and Dismisses Action Against Attorney March 21, 2009 < Back Share to: Litigation can be a contact sport. It is not for the meek or mild, certainly in emotionally charged or high exposure cases. While the line between permissble probing and abusive litigation tactics can blur, the New Jersey Appellate Division recently made clear that the nature and scope of inquiry during a deposition will rarely support a claim against an attorney for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrage and the like. In Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, the parents of an infant filed a medical malpractice action against a hospital and emergency room physician for the death of their child. The parents claimed that the physician refused to admit their infant who later died at home of respiratory distress. The father summoned the local police and asked to speak to the chief of police because "he suspected that there had been a murder." During his deposition, the defense lawyer probed the basis for the father's reference to murder: did he refer to the hospital, the child's nanny, baby nurse or possibly mother? Had anyone handled the baby roughly in the past? When the questioning continued, the plaintiff's lawyer interrupted and said "if you ask one question that is suggestive of the garbage I just heard from your mouth, this deposition will end." The following month, the plaintiff's attorney on behalf of the parents filed the above mentioned action against the defense lawyer. The trial court dismissed the parents' action and awarded costs and sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. On appeal, the Appellate Division discussed the wide scope of New Jersey's litgation privilege. The decision made clear that the privlege is applicable to communications made during judicial proceedings, pretrial investigation and now discovery depositions. Good judgment should guide the scope of discovery on the part of all attorneys. However, it is our professional duty, at times, to ask unccomfortable questions during the course of the zealous representation of our clients. It is reassuring to know that we do not subject ourselves to personal liability because we ask the tough questions. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1626-07.pdf Previous Next Contact

News Plaintiff’s Pothole Predicament Prevails on Appeal (NY) August 15, 2019 < Back Share to: In Karpel v National Grid Generation LLC, plaintiff alleged a trip and fall over a raised edge in the roadway. At the time of the fall, excavation work was being done in the vicinity. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the alleged defective condition was trivial and therefore not actionable, or was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division Second Department overturned the lower court’s decision. The Appellate Division held that defendants did not meet their prima facie burden. A defendant seeking dismissal of a negligence complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it posed. The hole measured approximately four-feet wide, eight-feet long, and at least one-inch deep. Although there were orange markings around its perimeter, the Court found the argument unconvincing. “Proof that a dangerous condition is open and obvious does not preclude a finding of liability ... but is relevant to the issue of the plaintiff's comparative negligence.” The Court held the hole was inherently dangerous, even if open and obvious, and therefore, not sufficient to be granted summary judgment. Thanks to Paul Vitale for his contribution to this post. Please contact Georgia Coats with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Expert’s Opinion Rejected Where There Was No Foundation for Opinion February 22, 2017 < Back Share to: Plaintiffs and co-defendants often submit expert opinions in an effort to create issues of fact to defeat summary judgment motions. However, if the expert opinion is not based on concrete evidence, it may be rejected. In Taylor v. Park Ave. & 84th St. Inc., plaintiff sued for property damage as a result of leaks in a cooperative apartment following renovations. The renovations included the removal and replacement of a greenhouse on the roof terrace and placement of a stone terrace. After renovations were completed, planters were placed on top of pavers on the terrace with an irrigation system. Approximately six months later, plaintiff discovered a leak. One of the defendant subcontractors moved for summary judgment prior to its deposition, alleging that all its work was on an exterior wall of the penthouse on the opposite side of the terrace from where the leak was found. The general contractor’s testimony confirmed that the subcontractor did not perform any work at the leak location, and additional testimony that plaintiff’s boyfriend installed the irrigation system by “lifting the pavers and cutting the roof membrane” further supported the subcontractor’s position that it could not have caused the leak. In opposition, the building contractor offered an affidavit of a roofing consultant that opined that the leak could have been caused by “the stucco work performed on the penthouse wall adjoining the roof terrace.” However, the court rejected the opinion since the expert offered no foundation for the opinion. The court granted the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment since despite the opposition, there were no issues of fact (as opposed to speculative opinion) as to the lack of the subcontractor’s liability. Parties should remember that the mere existence of an expert affidavit may not defeat a summary judgment motion. Thanks to Valeria Prizimenter for her contribution to this post.   Previous Next Contact

News Expert Needed to Explain Dangerous Mannequin Placement (NJ) November 9, 2017 < Back Share to: In Reiger v. Ann, Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division faced the strange question as to whether expert testimony was required for plaintiff to pursue claims against a defendant store owner for its placement of a mannequin platform display near a mirror. Plaintiff was shopping in defendant’s clothing store and tried on a scarf in the dressing area. As plaintiff was backing away from a mirror, her heel hit a mannequin platform and she tripped over the platform, causing a mannequin on the platform to fall over plaintiff, injuring her shoulder and elbow. Plaintiff testified that she did not notice the platform display when she entered the dressing area. Defendant retained an engineering expert who opined that plaintiff’s accident was caused by her failure to maintain a proper lookout in the direction that she was moving before she fell. Defendant’s expert also found that the aisle between the mirror and the platform exceeded the applicable building codes, and that plaintiff’s accident was not caused by a defective condition. Although plaintiff retained an engineering expert who conducted a site inspection, plaintiff failed to serve an expert report during discovery. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the platform’s placement breached a standard of care and constituted a dangerous condition. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiff required (and lacked) expert testimony to establish that there was insufficient space between the mirror and the mannequin platform. On appeal, plaintiff argued that a liability expert was not required to help a jury decide whether defendant breached a duty of care because her injuries were a foreseeable result of defendant’s placement of the mannequin platform across from the mirror. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision and agreed that plaintiff needed an expert to explain how the placement of the mannequin platform constituted a dangerous condition because "the customs and standards" for retail store displays and safe clearance conditions are not part of a jury’s common knowledge. The Appellate Division further reasoned that it was undisputed that defendant did not violate any building codes, and the platform was neither camouflaged nor protruding into the access way. Thanks to Ken Eng for his contribution to this post and please write to Mike Bono for more information. Previous Next Contact

News New Jersey Juries Not Required to Award Compensatory Damages March 23, 2010 < Back Share to: In Kozma v. Starbucks Coffee Company et al., a 50-year old man slipped and fell after getting some coffee at Starbucks. The jury found Starbucks 60% liable and plaintiff 40% liable. Although the allocation of fault fell in plaintiff’s favor, the evidence that came out during trial, namely that plaintiff had prior work injuries similar to the injury claimed at the time of the Starbucks slip-and-fall, that plaintiff had traveled to both Florida and his home in the Poconos after the accident, and that he had even played a few rounds of golf, led the jury to return a verdict with no monetary damages awarded to the plaintiff. Plaintiff disagreed, and appealed the verdict solely on the issue of damages, arguing that the instruction that the jury was allowed to return an award of zero dollars was erroneous. The Appellate Division found that the jury instructions were proper and deferred to the trial court jury and its “infusion of community notions of justice” into its verdict. Thanks to Alison Weintraub for her contribution to this post. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a3908-08.pdf Previous Next Contact

News The $64,000 Question -- "Can I have more than $64,000?" (PA) May 2, 2019 < Back Share to: In Wright v. Marriott Decision, plaintiff alleged injuries from an alleged slip and fall on a patch of ice on a walkway outside a Residence Inn. Specifically, plaintiff injured his left shoulder which required arthroscopy. A Philadelphia jury awarded plaintiff $64,000. After the verdict, plaintiff appealed arguing that the award would have been higher if he was not prejudiced by the exclusion of his expert on the eve of the trial. The Superior Court panel of judges granted a new trial to plaintiff on damages , stating that the trial court judge misapplied the standard for admitting expert testimony. According to Judge Kunselman, “Plaintiff’s expert has dealt with patients in his practice who have orthopedic or shoulder-type injuries and therefore has possesses a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge regarding plaintiff’s medical issues sufficient to assist the trier of fact,” as required by the state Supreme Court’s 1995 ruling in Miller v Brass Rail Tavern. Judge Kunselman further explained, “that an orthopedist may have been more qualified does not mean plaintiff’s expert was totally unqualified to serve as an expert on causation and damages in this personal injury case.” The panel ultimately found that not allowing plaintiff’s expert to testify at trial prejudiced the plaintiff and thus he did not get a fair trial on damages. Judge Kunselman stated: Without Dr. Sedacca’s testimony, Wright could not offer a credible medical perspective. Wright himself did not have any medical training or knowledge; he could only explain his personal experience—what happened, how he felt, and the treatments he received. However, there was no objective expert medical testimony to corroborate his subjective testimony. Dr. Sedacca’s testimony was critical to fully explaining to the jury what happened to Wright physically, how his injuries affected him and the extent to which they affected him. Most significant though is that Wright was not able to present evidence of his prognosis and the impact this injury would have on him into the future. The error furthered prejudiced the plaintiff when Marriott emphasized to the jury during closing argument that the expert had failed to put forth any medical expert testimony. Thus, plaintiff now has another chance to obtain a higher award. Thanks to Melisa Buchowiec for her contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.   Previous Next Contact

News Homeowners Awarded Summary Judgment Before Completion Of Discovery August 11, 2023 < Back Share to: On August 2, 2023, the Appellate Division, Second Department in Valencia v. Glinski, upheld the lower court’s decision that granted summary judgment to homeowner defendants dismissing the claims against them under the Labor Law though discovery had not yet been complete. The defendants in this matter purchased a single-family residence in East Hampton. During renovations to the home, two plaintiffs were injured when scaffolding they were standing on collapsed. Consequently, an action was commenced to recover for personal injuries alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241. Defendants were granted summary judgment under the homeowner’s exemption of the Labor Law because they did not supervise or control the means and methods of the work performed. On appeal, the appellants argued, among other things, that the defendants’ motion was premature because discovery had not yet been completed. In affirming the decision, the Appellate Court pointed to the well-established homeowner’s exemption under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) which provides immunity for owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work. The Court noted that this exemption is applicable to second homes provided the owner does not use the single-family residence exclusively for commercial purposes. Shortly after purchasing the home, defendants contracted to have renovations done. While the work was being performed, the defendants stayed with family in Port Washington but would use the home on the weekends. With one exception, they were never present at the home while work was being performed. They claimed they did not direct or control the work or provide any ladders, scaffolding, or other tools for the job. In opposition, the appellants submitted an affidavit containing hearsay and self-serving statements about the defendants fixing the house up to sell it and conditions inside of the home making it appear that the home had not been used or occupied for months or years. Though the defendants did eventually sell the home because of a job transfer to California, they maintained that the home, prior to the accident, was only intended to be used as a residence for their family. The Court believed them dismissing the causes of action claiming violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Likewise, the Court dismissed the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action against the defendants because they did not possess the authority to supervise or control the manner in which the work was performed. The Court found the appellants’ argument that the motion was premature was without merit citing authority that mere speculation that sufficient evidence may be uncovered to defeat the motion is insufficient. This case serves as a reminder of the strength of this exemption under the Labor Law and the timing in which relief under it can be sought. Should you have any questions, contact John Diffley. Previous Next Contact

News Preview of PA Supreme Court's Coming Decision on Bad Faith Claims January 25, 2017 < Back Share to: In this Of Interest post, we highlight a notable matter that is currently unfolding in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Here, we provide an up-to-date history of Rancosky DBN v. Washington National Insurance Company in order to prepare readers for the significance of the eventual PA Supreme Court ruling. In 1998, LeAnn Rancosky purchased a Cancer Policy from Washington National Insurance Company (now “Conseco”) to be paid through automatic payroll deductions from her employer, the United States Postal Service. LeAnn was diagnosed with Stage III ovarian cancer on February 4, 2003 and was unable to work from that day forward. However, due to accrued vacation time and sick days, LeAnn was paid – and therefore her Cancer Policy premiums were paid – through June 24, 2003. Beginning May 20, 2003, LeAnn sent multiple Waiver of Premium (“WOP”) forms to Conseco, and assumed these forms were accepted, as Conseco continued to pay LeAnn’s cancer treatment bills through 2005. But when LeAnn relapsed in 2006, Conseco refused coverage on the grounds that LeAnn’s policy lapsed in May 2003 because they never received a completed WOP form correctly identifying a valid date of disability. LeAnn continued to send in form after form over the next five years, but Conseco was firm in denying coverage. In truth, Conseco needed only to tell LeAnn that she made a simple date error on her WOP form that, if corrected, would remedy all coverage issues, but Conseco never did this. As a result, on December 22, 2008, LeAnn sued Conseco for, among other counts, bad faith. The case continued after LeAnn’s death in February 2010, and a non-jury trial conducted in June 24, 2014 ruled in Conseco’s favor on the bad faith claims. The lower court ruled against LeAnn because she failed to show that Conseco had a “dishonest purpose” or “motive of self-interest or ill-will” against her. The appeals court reversed this ruling under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, holding that “ill-will” is not a third requirement to prove bad faith, but rather a point of consideration to be determined in connection with the second aspect of the well-settled two-prong bad faith test: (1) whether the insurer had a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy; and (2) whether the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim. The appeals court ordered a new trial for LeAnn on her bad faith claims against Conseco, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is currently reviewing that decision. In light of this background, is important to note that 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371 does not actually define “bad faith”, nor has the PA Supreme Court ever done so. Thus, this pending case has the potential to both clarify and expand – or narrow – the scope of an insurer’s bad faith depending on how the Court chooses to incorporate the “ill-will” consideration. We will update this posting with a report on the decision of the PA Supreme Court as it becomes available. Thanks to Melanie Brother for her contribution. For more information contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com .   Previous Next Contact

News Judicial Deference in NJ? April 9, 2012 < Back Share to: In law school, one is taught that if two judges are of equal rank, the one cannot overrule the other on the same issues in the same case. Yet the practice of law sometimes reveals contrary results. In the case of Little, et al. v. KIA Motors, New Jersey’s appellate division was faced with the following fact pattern arising out of a class action consumer fraud case. In brief (and out of respect the opinion talks about the “first trial judge” and the “second judge” without using names), in November 2008, the first judge issued various rulings (which are not essential to this blawg post) relevant to Kia’s request for post-trial relief. In August 2011, the second judge overruled the first trial judge’s orders and issued new rulings that contradicted the first judge’s orders. The instant appeal resulted. The appellate division reversed the second judge and reiterated that “decisions of law made in a case should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the pendency of that case.” Good news for litigants and their insurers who count on finality in litigation. For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact