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- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Declaratory Judgment Actions Are Not A Discovery Tool (NJ) July 26, 2012 < Back Share to: One of the methods used by No-Fault providers to fight fraudulent claims is to establish that improprieties with a health care provider’s ownership structure, billing practices, and regulatory compliance. But recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that an insurance company cannot file a declaratory judgment action solely seeking discovery of in an effort to prevent insurance fraud, even where an insured patient has assigned personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to the health care provider. In Selective Insurance Company of America v. Hudson East Pain Management, Selective filed for declaratory judgment against Hudson East Pain Management and several other entities because it noticed what it considered to be “suspicious patterns” in the treatments rendered to Selective’s insured patients, as well as in the corporate links among the various entities. Selective’s insureds had assigned their PIP benefits to the health care providers after being injured in motor vehicle accidents. Although it had requested information on ownership, billing practices, and regulatory compliance from the various entities, Selective did not receive the information it sought, and as a result, filed its declaratory judgment action, citing the “cooperation clause” in its insurance policies, as well as New Jersey statutory authority. The trial court sided with Selective, and ordered the health care providers to produce the requested materials. The Appellate Division reversed this order, holding that Selective’s reliance on the cooperation clause in its insurance policies was improper, and that its demands for discovery went beyond the statutory authority of New Jersey law. On review, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division, but for different reasons than expressed in the Appellate Division’s decision. The court held that because an assignee of benefits as no greater rights than an assignor, the assignee also cannot have greater duties than the assignor under the contract. Therefore, because the Selective insurance policies did not require the insured patients to provide the information sought by Selective in its declaratory judgment action, the policies could not require the health care providers to present that information. Additionally, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that the PIP statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13, did not provide for the sort of discovery sought by Selective. Finally, the court held that, although New Jersey had a clear public policy against insurance fraud, the means employed by Selective were not the correct avenue for preventing insurance fraud. Although this case does not undermine the ability of an insurance company to seek injunctive or other relief, along with discovery, through the use of a declaratory judgment complaint, it does stand for the proposition that a quest for this sort of discovery cannot be the sole object of the complaint. Thanks to Christina Emerson for her contribution to this post. If you would like more information, please write to mbono@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News "Threshold" Motions harder to come by in NY October 3, 2012 < Back Share to: Last year in December 2011 we reported that the Court of Appeals rejected a rule that would make "contemporaneous quantitative measurements" a requirement in demonstrating a serious physical injury in a New York motor vehicle accident lawsuit. See Perl v. Meher, 18 NY3d 208 (2011). As a result, range of motion tests are not necessary immediately after an accident in order to prove a serious physical injury. The Court reasoned that a post-injury treating physician is concerned abut treatment of symptoms, as opposed to range of motion tests. The ramifications of this ruling are significant, because plaintiffs now need less evidence to demonstrate serious physical injury. The implications of this previous ruling were felt in the recent decision of Njie v. Thompson. New York Supreme Court Judge Silver granted defendant's threshold motion under NY. Ins. Law §5102, because plaintiff's range of motion was presently normal, and his MRI revealed no tears. The First Department reversed, because plaintiff's initial treating physician diagnosed a shoulder tear, establishing the requisite causation. Plaintiff's trial expert found some limitation in ROM. The Njie court held that under Perl, no further contemporaneous tests were required to defeat defendant's threshold motion. The Perl decision seemingly gives courts another basis upon which to deny (or discourage the filing of) threshold motions, as evidenced by its decision in Njie. Thanks to Brian Gibbons for his contribution. For more information, contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact
- Dara S. Omotayo-Bradley | WCM Law
Dara S. Omotayo-Bradley Associate Pennsylvania domotayobradley@wcmlaw.com 267 665 0715 Professional Experience Prior to joining WCM, Dara worked for the City of Philadelphia as an Assistant City Solicitor in the Child Welfare Department. In that role, she represented the Department of Human Services in dependency matters, where she gained meaningful courtroom experience and developed a strong foundation in client advocacy. Dara is a Dallas, Texas native who moved to Philly in 2020 for law school. She has four dogs that keep her busy. When she isn’t playing with the dogs, she enjoys tending to her ever-expanding garden. Professional Activities Pennsylvania State Bar Association, Member News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Rutgers Law School B.A. in Psychology, Texas Tech University, magna cum laude Bar Admissions Pennsylvania
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Education Doesn't End with High School At Group Home for Charitable Immunity Act in NJ December 16, 2010 < Back Share to: “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” Yet, when it comes to application of the Charitable Immunity Act every effort is made to re-label and rename the essential nature of an eligible organization to avoid the immunity offered. In a tragic case involving the death of a developmentally disabled young resident of a community group home, his estate tried to portray the home as other than an educational organization. The decedent had been a resident from age eight to twenty-one. He had attended elementary and secondary education with the program. Even after attaining the age of eighteen, he was still subject to an Individual Habilitation Plan that addressed his continuing life skills development. This Plan included a goal with respect to small convenience store purchases. It was during an outing to a convenience store that the decedent choked on a bagel, which ultimately resulted in his death. Despite arguments that the educational scope of the organization should be limited in time to when the decedent attended school, the Court found as a matter of law that his continued participation in life skills training fell within the home’s educational mission. However, since the organization’s by-laws listed its organizational purpose as exclusively “charitable,” the Court also looked at the home’s entitlement to immunity under this more generic qualifier. While an exclusively “educational” organization need not prove its “charitable” status through funding information, this is not so for a more broadly defined charitable organization. Although the organization raised less than 2% of its revenue from charitable donations (about $1.1 million), the court disagreed that a pre-set revenue percentage factor would be determinative of the charitable status of the organization. The Court concluded that the combination of educational and charitable elements for the group home clearly placed it within the ambit of the Act. See Komninos v. Bancroft Neurohealth, Inc., http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4041-09.pdf If you would like more information, please contact Denise Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Workers' Compensation Defense Applies to Alter Egos October 13, 2008 < Back Share to: The defense afforded to employers by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law may also extend to suits brought against an entity that is found to be the alter ego of the corporation that employs the plaintiff. In Cappella v. Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, the plaintiff was employed by R.I. Suresky & Son, Inc., a car dealership. The plaintiff claimed that he was injured when he fell in the dealership lot. Since he could not bring suit against his employer, the plaintiff sued Suresky at Hatfield Lane, the owner of the lot. Suresky at Hatfield Lane argued that it was an alter ego of the plaintiff's employer and submitted proof that the plaintiff's employer exercised managerial and financial control over it. The court ruled that this proof sufficiently established a prima facie defense under the Workers' Compensation Law. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_07603.htm Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News No Coverage If No Nexus Between Injury And Claimed Negligent Maintenance April 1, 2009 < Back Share to: In the recent decision of Penn National Ins. Co. v. Costa, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in order for an injury to arise “out of the maintenance, operation or use of a motor vehicle” there must be a substantial nexus between the injury and the allegedly negligent maintenance, operation or use of the vehicle. In Costa, the mechanic plaintiff slipped and fell on his employer’s icy driveway and struck his head on a tire jack that was being used to change a flat tire. The plaintif was not involved in the tire repair at the time of his accident. Thus, the Court found that there was no substantial nexus between the plaintiff’s injuries and the allegedly negligent maintenance of the motor vehicle. Consequently, the automobile insurance policy did not provide coverage for the claim. Thanks to Claudia Condruz for her contribution to this post. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/Supreme%2008.pdf Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News IRS Wants $29 Million for Artwork That Can't Be Sold August 24, 2012 < Back Share to: The heirs of New York art dealer Ileana Sonnabend have been placed in quite the quandary. They have inherited a work of art that cannot legally be sold -- but the IRS claims that they owe $29 million in taxes based on their appraised value of the work. Robert Rauschenberg was an American artist known for his unique "combines," in which he put together various objects, often to accompany paintings. The work at issue here, Canyon, included a stuffed bald eagle. Sale of a bald eagle is illegal under federal law. Indeed, possession of a bald eagle, alive or dead, is a violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, but a waiver was obtained for this work years ago because it was shown that the eagle was killed before the law went into effect. Because of that law, it would be illegal for the heirs to sell the work. But the IRS's Advisory Law Panel put a valuation of $65 million on the work, allegedly because it could, in theory, be sold on the black market. That appraised value created a tax bill of more than $29 million. The ruling has been challenged in tax court, and we will continue to follow this matter. If you would like more information, please write to Mike Bono at mbono@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Do CGL Policies Now Insure Data Breaches? April 29, 2016 < Back Share to: The case that everyone is talking about is Travelers Indemnity v. Portal Health, a just released, unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion. The quick story is that the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court opinion and held that Travelers owed coverage (specifically defense) under a CGL policy for a data breach. The real story is a bit more nuanced. In the case, Portal Healthcare, a Virginia based company, was sued in NY in a class action lawsuit. In the lawsuit, patients of Glen Falls Hospital claimed that Portal Healthcare failed to safeguard medical records entrusted to Portal Healthcare by the hospital and instead allowed those records to be posted on the internet – accessible to everyone via a Google search. Portal Healthcare was insured by Travelers under two consecutive commercial general liability insurance policies – a 2012 policy and a 2013 policy. The Policies were not standard policies – rather they contained special endorsements that expanded the scope of personal injury, advertising injury and web site injury. Specifically, the 2012 Policy contained a Web Xtend Liability Endorsement that deleted and replaced the definition of Personal and Advertising Injury liability. The 2013 Policy contained an Amendment of Coverage B – Personal And Advertising Liability Endorsement that deleted and replaced the definition of Personal and Advertising Injury liability. Under both endorsements, the parties (and court) seemed to agree that coverage was triggered if the underlying complaint alleged: (1) injury arising out of the offense of “electronic publication of material that . . . gives unreasonable publicity to a person’s private life” (the language utilized in the insuring agreement of the 2012 Policy) or (2) injury caused by the offense of “electronic publication of material that . . . discloses information about a person’s private life” (the language utilized in the insuring agreement of the 2013 Policy). In respect of the first point, Travelers argued that, although the data was available to the general public, since Portal Healthcare did not intend to publish it, publication did not occur. This argument was rejected by the court which held that it was the fact of publication (and not the intent of publisher) that mattered. In respect of the second point, Travelers argued that there was no “publicity” given to a person’s private life as the leak was not intended to generate publicity. This argument was also rejected by the court which held that since the leaked data was available to the general public, publicity had occurred. All of this seems rather straightforward, so why all the fuss? It seems that a top sheet review might be to blame. When you look at the trial court’s decision and the policies themselves, you see that the Travelers’ decision to broaden the scope of potential claims that would qualify as “personal and advertising injury” is the root cause of the decision. So, it’s true that CGL policies might have more potential exposure to data breaches – but only if you enhance the coverages. For more information about this post please e-mail Bob Cosgrove. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Contractors Beware: PA Court Held Open And Obvious Defense Inapplicable To Contractor September 17, 2021 < Back Share to: A recent decision from the Pennsylvania Superior Court highlights the problem with rushing to judgment in the evaluation of premises liability claims. See Miller v. WRDH Holdings, LLC, No. 3543 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2021). Miller involved injuries allegedly sustained when the plaintiff fell while attempting to walk around a temporary sidewalk closure sign. The City of Philadelphia required the sign when it issued the permit to the contractor performing construction work in the area. WRDH Holdings, Inc. (“WRDH”), the contractor performing the work and the entity responsible for placement and maintenance of the temporary sign, was the only remaining defendant at the time of trial. Although Plaintiff admitted that she observed the sign as she approached the sidewalk, she denied seeing the base of the sign and claimed that she was unable to get around the base due to pedestrian traffic. The testimony of other witnesses established four feet of space for pedestrian traffic around the sign. After Plaintiff called her liability expert, and before Plaintiff closed her case, WRDH moved for an entry of nonsuit asserting Plaintiff could not prevail because WRDH owed no duty to warn of open and obvious conditions. WRDH’s argument was premised on application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 and 384. Since these two sections for the basis of the appeal, we discuss each section here. Pursuant to Section 342, a possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to licensees by a condition on the land only if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger; and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved; and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved. Restatement (Second) of Torts §342. Section 384 extends the protections of Section 342 to individuals/entities who, on behalf of the possessor, erect a structure or create a condition on the land. In such circumstances, the individual/entity performing such work is subject to the same liability as the possessor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §384. WRDH asserted that it was entitled to the same protections as the possessor and, as such, owed no duty to plaintiff because the condition was open and obvious. Plaintiff argued that Section 384 was inapplicable because WRDH was not the owner or possessor of the premises and was not working on behalf of the owner/possessor of the premises. Instead, Plaintiff asserted Section 386 controlled. The trial court granted the nonsuit and thereafter denied Plaintiff’s motion to remove the nonsuit. The Plaintiff appealed. Four issues were raised on appeal. First, whether the trial court erred in granting the nonsuit. Second, whether the trial court abused its discretion or otherwise erred in denying the motion to vacate the nonsuit. Third, whether the trial court erred in labeling the Plaintiff as a licensee and refusing to apply §386 of the Restatement. Finally, whether the trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff recognized the hazard, i.e. that the hazardous condition was open and obvious. The Superior Court affirmed all four questions and reversed and remanded. In evaluating the issues, the Superior Court first considered the trial court’s written opinion. The trial court believed, “although not clearly established,” that the defendant was the occupier of the land and the plaintiff a licensee. Pursuant to Section 342c, the plaintiff must show that she did not know and had no reason to know of the condition or the risk of harm from the temporary sign. The trial court’s decision relied on long standing precedent in Pennsylvania regarding application of the open and obvious doctrine. See e.g. Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (PA. 1983). However, as the Superior Court noted, Carrender is presupposes that WRDH is the owner or possessor of the land. The evidence established at trial demonstrated that WRDH was neither the owner nor possessor. Therefore, the Superior Court opined, the trial court committed reversible error not only in deciding questions of fact which should have been left for the jury, but also in reaching the conclusion as to the defendant’s status. The Superior Court further held that the trial court erred in considering Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384 because there was no evidence that WRDH was acting on behalf of the owner or possessor in placing the sidewalk closure sign. The Superior Court agreed with the Plaintiff/Appellant, finding that the trial court erred in failing to apply Restatement (Second) of Torts §386. Section 386 provides as follows: Any person, except the possessor of land or a member of his household or one acting on his behalf, who creates or maintains upon the land a structure or other artificial condition which he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others upon or outside of the land, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to them, irrespective of whether they are lawfully upon the land, by the consent of the possessor or otherwise, or are trespassers as between themselves and the possessor. Restatement (Second) of Torts §386. Section 386 does not contain language regarding open and obvious conditions and, as such, WRDH was not entitled to assert same as a defense. The decision should serve as a warning to practitioners and insurance carriers handling premises liability claims in Pennsylvania. A rush to judgment regarding the status of any party or the nature of the alleged hazardous condition could come back to bite you. A methodical approach ensures proper adjustment and defense of these claims. Please contact Jennifer Seme with any questions. Previous Next Contact
- WCM Law
News New York Courts Generally Won’t Relinquish Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Action to Another State July 5, 2024 < Back Share to: In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Properties Corp. , No. 2019–07575, 2024 WL 3168227, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. June 26, 2024), the Appellate Division for the Second Department reiterated the general rule that New York’s courts should not relinquish jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action to the courts of another state. The plaintiff insurers issued liability insurance policies to a producer of gasoline and fuel additives, and the policies at issue were in effect during the period that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) alleged that the gasoline producer caused or permitted water pollution with the fuel additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”) in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. The NJDEP sued the gasoline producer in New Jersey state court, and the case was subsequently removed to New Jersey federal court and then transferred to New York federal court. A second action was commenced against the gasoline producer in Pennsylvania state court, removed to Pennsylvania federal court, and transferred to New York federal court. A third action was commenced in Maryland state court. The gasoline producer made claims for coverage in connection with the legal proceedings in each state. The insurance carrier issued a partial denial and then commenced a declaratory judgment action in New York seeking an order that it owed no coverage for any of the three underlying lawsuits. The insured thereafter commenced a declaratory judgment action in New Jersey seeking an order that coverage was owed for the New Jersey underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the insurer’s declaratory judgment action (in New York) took priority over the insured’s declaratory judgment action (in New Jersey) because it commenced earlier. The Second Department affirmed. It cited the foundational principal that, generally, “the court which has first taken jurisdiction is the one in which the matter should be determined and it is a violation of the rules of comity to interfere.” The appellate court noted that exceptions to this general rule exist where the circumstances involve vexation, oppression, unjustness, or inequity. The court held that none of these factors were present, and therefore the New York courts should not relinquish their jurisdiction over the coverage dispute. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Getty Properties Corporation .pdf Download PDF • 177KB Previous Next Jason Laicha Jason Laicha Counsel +1 267 239 5526 jlaicha@wcmlaw.com Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Tailgating Plaintiff Loses Labor Law Claims (NY) January 6, 2017 < Back Share to: New York Labor Law § 240(1) protects laborers from certain gravity–related risks in connection with the in the erection, demolition, repairing, or altering, of a building or structure. The statutory scheme imposes strict liability on all contractors and owners who fail to provide adequate protection from these gravity-related risks. In Eddy v. John Hummel Custom Builders Inc.,the plaintiff was injured when he fell off the back of a flatbed truck and was struck by a 100-lb piece of iron grate. Plaintiff and his coworker had loaded heavy construction material, including the iron grate, onto the back of a pickup truck to transport it across the construction site. The men placed the cast iron grate on the open tailgate of the truck because the remainder of the truck bed was full. As they were only traveling a short distance, they did not secure any of the materials that they placed onto the truck. The truck bed did not have any seat or platform to sit. Plaintiff’s co-worker advised him to sit in the front passenger seat because he thought it was unsafe for him to ride in the back of the truck. But rather than taking this advice, the plaintiff decided not only to ride in the back of the truck, but to sit on top of the cast iron grate, which was lying on the truck’s open tailgate, with his feet dangling over the edge of the tailgate. When his coworker began driving, plaintiff fell to the ground, and the cast iron grate fell onto the plaintiff, causing him to sustain injuries. Plaintiff sued alleging violations under §240(1) and § 241(6) of the Labor Law. The general contractor moved for summary judgment on all claims, claiming that §240(1) and §241(60 were inapplicable to plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court denied the motion, and the general contractor filed an appeal to the Second Department. Citing case law holding that workers who fell from the back of a pickup truck, or who were injured by objects being unloaded from a flatbed truck while standing on the ground next to the truck are not protected by § 240(1). The Second Department determined that the plaintiff’s accident did not arise out of an elevation-related risk and further held that the plaintiff’s decision to sit in this position was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of his injuries and the decision was reversed in favor of the defendant. Thanks to Jorgelina Foglietta for her contribution to this post and please write to Mike Bono if you would like more information. Previous Next Contact
- Nishall N. Jairam | WCM Law
Nishall N. Jairam Counsel Florida njairam@wcmlaw.com 561 231 2684 Professional Experience As a seasoned insurance attorney with more than two decades of experience, Nishall represents insurers in first‑party property and complex insurance matters. Over the course of his career, Nishall has handled cases from their initial stages through final resolution, developing a reputation for steadiness under pressure and meticulous in execution. His practice encompasses residential and commercial property claims, assignment‑of‑benefits disputes, coverage issues, and high‑exposure litigation, requiring both legal precision and practical problem‑solving. Throughout his career, Nishall has worked closely with claims professionals, consultants, and experts, valuing collaboration as an essential part of effective advocacy. He understands that insurance litigation is not just about winning motions or defending depositions, but about managing risk, controlling costs, and aligning legal strategy with business objectives. His approach emphasizes clear communication, realistic evaluations of exposure, and measured decision‑making. Qualities that reflect his belief that patience, when paired with experience, leads to sound judgment. What distinguishes Nishall is his ability to remain composed and focused even in contentious, high‑stakes environments. He brings a balanced perspective shaped by years of courtroom experience, negotiations, and client counseling. Rather than reacting to conflict, he approaches each matter with patience and foresight, understanding that the best outcomes often come from restraint, preparation, and timing. Outside of the technical aspects of the law, Nishall views his work as a responsibility to bring clarity to complex situations. Whether advising on litigation strategy, evaluating coverage issues, or resolving disputes, he strives to be a steady presence for clients navigating uncertainty. His career reflects a commitment to professionalism, integrity, and the belief that patience—applied consistently over time—is not only a virtue, but a lasting advantage. News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., St. John’s University School of Law B.S. in Management, St. John’s University, cum laude Bar Admissions Florida

