Search Results
4133 items found for ""
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Landowner Not Liable For Hidden Defect In Fallen Tree January 8, 2009 < Back Share to: In Down v. Town of Oyster Bay, the Supreme Court of Nassau County recently held that a tree's internal staining and discoloration are not outwardly visible signs of a defect and, in doing so, granted the property owner summary judgment against the plaintiff’s claim that she was injured by the defendant’s falling tree. The court declined to impose a duty on a landowner to constantly check all trees for non-visible decay. Instead, the court held that a landowner is only required to take action if there are signs of decay or disease readily observable. http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/10JD/Nassau/decisions/INDEX/INDEX_new/LALLY/2008DEC/001125-07.pdf Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Mt. Sinai WTC findings called into question. September 10, 2007 < Back Share to: NYT calls into question validity of Mt. Sinai findings in respect of 9/11 clean-up workers who allege exposure to toxins. According to Times, the extent and scope of the injuries may be grossly inflated. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/nyregion/07sinai.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Brooklyn Justice December 14, 2007 < Back Share to: Bernadette Bayne was appointed to the NYC Criminal Court 20 years ago. When she came up for re-appointment in 1994, then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani declined to re-appoint her because, among other things, she had once handcuffed a lawyer to his chair. In 1999 she ran for Civil Court and was rated "not approved" by the Brooklyn and NYC Bar Assns. She was elected. In 2003, she ran for Supreme Court and was rated "unqualified" by the same two bar assns. She was elected. Now, she has been rebuked by an appellate court reviewing a $14 million jury verdict for giving candy to the infant plaintiff in front of the jury, giving gifts to each individual juror during the trial, and for treating the defendants' lawyer unfairly. Welcome to Kings County. Previous Next Contact
- 404 | WCM Law
There’s Nothing Here... We can’t find the page you’re looking for. Check the URL, or head back home. Go Home
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Justice Is Still No Laughing Matter in NJ. March 15, 2013 < Back Share to: We previously commented on the case of NJ municipal judge Vincenzo Sicari who under the alias of "Vince August" plies his comedic trade by night (and administers justice and legal services by day). NJ's Supreme Court has now taken up the issue. The question is whether comedic performances are incompatible with the proper decorum required for judicial office -- as an officer of the court I will bite my tongue on further comment on this point. Who will get the last laugh? Stay tuned to find out! (And you thought that NJ's highest court had more important things to worry about). For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Notice To Wrong Town Official Of Defect Is Not Proper Notice To Town April 16, 2009 < Back Share to: In Gorman v. Town of Huntington, the plaintiff s commenced a personal injury action against the town due to an alleged uneven sidewalk in front of a local church. Four months prior to the plaintiff's accident, the pastor of the church sent a written complaint to the town's Department of Engineering Services, which is responsible for sidewalks, complaining of the condition and requesting a repair of the sidewalk. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division ruling and held that the Town of Huntington was entitled to summary judgment because the town did not receive prior written notice pursuant to the specific language of a local statute pertaining to notice The local statute designated the Town Clerk or the Town Superintendent of Highways as proper receipts of written notice of sidewalks defects. By statute, notice to a department that was not enumerated in the statute would invalidate the notice. Since the Department of Engineering Services was not a statutory designess, notice to the department was deemed insignificant. Thanks to Maju Varghese for his contribution to this submission http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_02648.htm Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News The Favor Bank. July 12, 2010 < Back Share to: In his classic work on greed in the 1980’s, Bonfire of the Vanities, Tom Wolfe summed-up the New York code of ethics: “What goes around comes around.” A deposit in the “favor bank,” Wolfe suggested, is like money; it may be withdrawn when needed. But what about requests for extensions of time to answer complaints -- are they deposits in the favor bank? The answer depends on where you are. In New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, requests for modest extensions are routine. Generally speaking, such requests are not viewed as favors; they are deemed (to change metaphors) par for the course. In other parts of the country, however, defense lawyers are reluctant to ask for extensions, reasoning that a favor granted necessarily results in a favor that must be returned. Unless the extension is conditioned upon waiving a right (such as moving against the complaint or contesting personal jurisdiction), 15-30 day extensions are granted and accepted as a matter of routine. In fact, a refusal to grant a reasonable request, if the issue later arises in court, is viewed as a breach of “civility,” a sin in the New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Also, under the local procedural codes of some federal and state courts, brief extensions must be granted as a matter of right. The moral of this note: Know the ethics and local procedural code of your jurisdiction. If you have any questions about this post, please contact Dennis Wade at dwade@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Dennis Wade to Speak At New York State Bar Association CLE Coverage Program March 9, 2018 < Back Share to: Each Spring, the New York State Bar Association hosts a Continuing Legal Education Program dedicated to coverage issues. This year, Dennis, a sports maven (and a weekend warrior), will discuss how the judiciary addresses or balances the risks inherent in sport and recreational activity. His written submission, with co-author Nicholas Schaefer, is entitled: Liability for Sporting and Recreational Activities. If you care to attend live, here is a link to the program www.nysba.org/PremisesLiability. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Third Circuit Clarifies Timing of Removal to Federal Court. October 20, 2011 < Back Share to: An issue that has tripped up many a litigator is the timing of just when a case must be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, the federal removal statute, states that the removal must occur within 30 days of service on the defendant. But what happens in a multiple defendant case? Must the removal occur within 30 days of the service of the first served defendant or 30 days from service of the last known defendant or does each defendant get its own 30 day window? The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have adopted the “first served” rule and held that the 30 day period ends 30 days after service on the first defendant. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the “later served” rule and held that each defendant gets 30 days from the date on which it, itself, was served to remove the case to federal court. In the case of Delalla v. Hanover Insurance, the Third Circuit has just weighed in. It has adopted the later served rule. Good news if you are in a multiple defendant products liability case in places like Atlantic City or Philadelphia! If you have any questions about this post or WCM’s product liability practice, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Who Pays Where Multiple CGL Policies Confer Additional Insured Status on the Defendant (NY)? June 18, 2013 < Back Share to: In Murnane Bldg. Contrs., Inc. v Zurich Am. Ins. Co., the plaintiff was the general contractor on the subject construction project. Darby Oakes, an employee of subcontractor J.T. Erectors was injured on the job and commenced a lawsuit against Murnane, Luck Bros, Inc., and others to recover damage for personal injuries. Luck Bros. had a CGL policy issued by Zurich Insurance Company that conferred additional insured status to Murnane. Murnane filed this declaratory judgment to enforce its claimed entitlement to a defense and indemnification based on the additional insured provision. Zurich in turn commenced a third-party action against Lexington Insurance Company, J.T. Erectors insurer, on the basis that Lexington had the duty to defend Murnane since Murnane was listed as an additional insured under Lexington’s CGL policy. Both policies purported to be excess over other insurance policies covering the same risk. On Murnane’s summary judgment motion, the trial court held that Zurich and Lexington were required to provide a defense to Murnane on a primary, pro-rata "co-basis" and, in effect, that Murnane was entitled to recover only 50% of the costs incurred by it or on its behalf in defending the underlying action. On appeal, the Second Department reversed the trial court’s decision noting that “where there are multiple policies covering the same risk, and each generally purports to be excess to the other, the excess coverage clauses are held to cancel out each other and each insurer contributes in proportion to its limit amount of insurance.” Furthermore, examining the facts surrounding the injury, the Court found it significant that Oakes’ injury arose out of work Luck Bros. was performing for Murnane and not through work J.T. Erectors was performing. By the plain terms of the Zurich policy, these facts warranted that Zurich was obligated to fully defend and indemnify Murnane on a primary and non-contributory basis. Special thanks to Michael Nunley for his contributions to this post. For more information, please contact Nicole Brown at nbrown@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Employee Exclusion Ambiguous? Sometimes. (NY) February 21, 2013 < Back Share to: In Essex Ins. Co. v. George E. Vickers, Jr. Enterprises Inc., the insurer sought a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify its insured or the owner of a construction project for an incident involving one of a subcontractor's employees. The incident involved Miguel Pinon, an employee of Paul Michael Contracting, which was hired by George Vickers, the insured general contractor. On June 25, 2005, Pinon, while on his lunch break at a beach not far from the construction site, dove into the water and broke his neck. The Workers' Compensation Board denied Pinon benefits on the basis that the accident did not occur in the course of his employment. After Pinon sued, Vickers and Lynn sought indemnification and defense from Essex, who disclaimed on the basis that even though Pinon was not injured during the course of his employment, the employee exclusion still barred coverage. In opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Vickers and Lynn argued that the word "employee" in this context was ambiguous because the policy did not define "employee" and that it was open to interpretation as to whether the parties intended for a worker acting outside the scope of his employment to be considered an "employee" within the meaning of the employee exclusion. The Supreme Court agreed with the insured and proerty owner and denied the insurer's motion. The Second Department affirmed. Another issue that arose during the case was whether the property owner had been named an additional insured on Vickers' policy. Vickers purchased a commercial liability policy from plaintiff ending March 25, 2004. Lynn was named as an additional insured on that policy. However, the renewal quotation for the policy beginning on March 26, 2004, stated "no additional insureds." In the insurance application to renew the policy for 2005 to 2006, Vickers listed Lynn as an additional insured. However, the renewal quotation for that coverage period stated that the quote included "NO AI's." The property owner moved for reform of the policy to add them as additional insureds based on mutual mistake. They argued that Vickers included them as additional insureds on the application for 2005-2006, that plaintiff did not refuse the request, and that plaintiff had previously granted Vickers' request to add Lynn as additional insureds on the 2003-2004 policy. Once again, the Supreme Court and Second Department agreed with Lynn, the property owner, and granted their request for reformation. Special thanks to Gabriel E. Darwick for his contribution. For more information, contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Another Covid-19 Victory for Insurers, This Time in New Jersey (NJ) March 19, 2021 < Back Share to: In a short, terse opinion, a federal judge in New Jersey ruled this week that owners of Wendy’s, T.G.I. Friday’s, Marriott, and Hilton franchises cannot recover for losses caused by Covid-19-related shutdowns. The decision adds to the growing amount of case law on this issue which has significantly favored insurers over policyholders. In Manhattan Partners, LLC v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., the franchisors sought coverage under their insurance policies which provided coverage for: 1) “direct physical loss of or damage caused by a Covered Cause of Loss to Covered Property”; 2) losses resulting from “the necessary Suspension of the Insured’s business activities at an Insured Location” where the Suspension is “due to direct physical loss of or damage to Property”; 3) business expenses incurred “due to direct physical loss of or damage caused . . . to Property”; and 4) losses sustained as a result of “the necessary Suspension of the Insured’s business activities at an Insured Location if the Suspension is caused by order of civil or military authority that prohibits access to the Location” where that order results “from a civil authority’s response to direct physical loss of or damage . . . to property not owned, occupied, leased or rented by the Insured.” In other words, under any theory of coverage, some direct physical loss was required. The Policies also contained a “Contamination” exclusion which barred coverage for “[a]ny condition of property due to the actual presence of … virus.” The insureds alleged that Covid-19 “led to physical loss and damage both within and within the vicinity of the various insured locations” and that “existed both on surfaces found within the insureds’ and surrounding premises as well as the breathable air circulating within” those premises. Judge Susan Wigenton, while stating that she was “sympathetic to the very real losses businesses have suffered during this pandemic,” rejected this argument. The Court held that the insureds’ “general statements that the COVID-19 virus was on surfaces and in the air at their properties is insufficient to show property loss or damage.” Accordingly, there was no coverage under any provision of the policy. This decision is one of many reaching the same conclusion based on a similar analysis. Thus, based on the recent case law, it seems unlikely, at this point, that insureds are going to succeed arguing that the Covid-19 virus resulted in “physical damage” to property. Thanks to Doug Giombarrese for his contribution to this post. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Colleen Hayes. Previous Next Contact