Wade Clark Mulcahy LLP

Recently, in De Castillo v. Reado, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 04195, the Appellate Division, Second Department ruled on an appeal made by plaintiff, after the Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff initiated the suit after alleging personal injuries suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving the defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” as defined by New York Insurance Law § 5102(d), a prerequisite for a personal injury action. The trial court held in favor of the defendant after determining that defendant demonstrated that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” under the law’s permanent consequential limitation of use or the significant limitation of use categories.

On appeal, the Second Department reversed the award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Although the court agreed that defendant made its prima facie showing that plaintiff suffered no serious injury, the court found error in the lower court’s reasoning. Specifically, the Second Department found that the lower court erred in requiring plaintiff “to submit evidence of contemporaneous quantitative measurements to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories.” As such, the court found that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment at this point of the litigation.

This case demonstrates the high bar that motor vehicle accident defendants face in arguing that a plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury” under New York Insurance Law. Not only must defendants prove against every single category of “serious injury” listed under the Insurance Law, but they must also consider the low bar that plaintiffs face in raising triable issues of fact regarding their alleged “serious injury.”