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Labor Law § 240(1): Tighter Rules, Less Wiggle Room for Defendants

August 23, 2024

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In Amaro v. New York City School Construction Authority, the Appellate Division, Second Department, provided a clarification regarding the application of Labor Law § 240(1), emphasizing the strict liability nature of the statute and the limited applicability of the sole proximate cause defense. The plaintiff, Oscar Amaro, was injured when a scaffold plank broke beneath him. Although Amaro was wearing a safety harness, he did not tie his lanyard to the scaffold because he was carrying a pipe in one hand and a clamp in the other and therefore was not able to unhook and re-hook the 4-foot-long lanyard to travel the 20-foot distance to the wall. When the injured plaintiff was approximately five feet away from his coworker, the wooden plank he stepped on broke, causing him to fall. The defendants argued that Amaro’s failure to secure the lanyard was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that he acted as a recalcitrant worker, thus attempting to circumvent liability under § 240(1).


The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, underscoring that once a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) is established, and it is shown to be a proximate cause of the injury, defendants face a steep burden in avoiding liability. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments, highlighting that the plaintiff’s alleged comparative negligence or any failure to utilize safety devices is not a defense unless it can be conclusively shown that these factors were the sole proximate cause of the injuries. Moreover, the court found no evidence to support the claim that Amaro was a recalcitrant worker.



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