News SDNY: Suit Alleging Christie’s Misidentification of da Vinci Work Time Barred February 12, 2011 < Back Share to: While the art world is riddled with forgeries and stolen works or art, some dealers may also have to be mindful of the reputable auction houses which display their collections. Last week, District Judge John Koetl of the Southern District of New York, dismissed as time barred an action by Jeanne Marchig, and her charitable trust, against Christie’s -- http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/02/02/DaVinci.pdf The suit alleged that Christie's negligently failed to identify her piece of art as a valuable drawing done by Leonardo da Vinci. The relevant facts are as follows. Jeanne Marchig approached the London location of the famed auction house seeking to consign and auction off a drawing she believed was composed by a late-Renaissance Italian painter. Christie’s resident old master drawing’s expert examined the piece and set an estimated value of $12,000-15,000. In January 1998, it ultimately sold at auction for $22,000. More than 11 years later, in July 2009, Marchig was approached by other experts in the art world who believed her previously sold drawing was actually the work of da Vinci, and could be valued as high as $100 million. Marchig brought an action against Christie’s claiming the auction house had been careless and failed to properly investigate her drawing. While both sides engaged experts to determine the authenticity and true origin of the work, Christie’s moved to bar the claims as untimely, alleging the applicable statute of limitations (3 years – negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and 6 years – negligent appraisal) had long since expired. Judge Koetl agreed and dismissed the action as too much time had passed between the appraisal in question and the suit. Special thanks to Chris O'Leary for his contributions to this post. For more information about it, or WCM's fine art practice, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News Failure to Prevent Bullying = Liability for Discrimination? September 29, 2011 < Back Share to: Last week New Jersey legislators passed an "Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights." The bill revised the 2002 New Jersey law on harassment, intimidation, and bullying in public schools. According to one legislator, the Bill "makes it clear that preventing and responding to incidents of harassment, intimidation and bullying are not optional." Rather the Bill sets forth specific protocols for investigating, reporting and training necessary to deal with bullying. The question for schools and courts to consider going forward is whether implementation of the protocols and/or the failure to do so, will render the schools liable in discrimination suits commenced by/on behalf of the bullied students. Thanks to Cheryl Fuchs for her contribution to this post. http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/11/nj_legislature_sends_anti-bull.html http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3466_S1.PDF Previous Next Contact

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News Claim Against NJSEA For Escalator Collapse At Giants Stadium Reinstated By NJ App. Div. February 17, 2011 < Back Share to: In DiBartolomeo v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority ( NJSEA), the Appellate Division reinstated a personal injury suit against the NJSEA for a 2006 escalator collapse at Giants Stadium after a New York Jets football game. Plaintiff claimed that as fans were exiting, the escalator buckled and the treads flattened causing patrons to slide down with bodies piling up at the bottom. The Appellate Division reversed summary judgment to the NJSEA finding that it was not entitled to immunity under the NJ Tort Claims Act. The court found that the stadium escalators could be found to pose a danger to the general public even when being used in a foreseeable manner. The potential dangerous condition was the NJSEA policy of operating the escalators that were rated for 300 lbs. per step, when it was foreseeable and likely that greater loads would be routinely applied. Please contact Robert Ball with any questions regarding this post. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a2716-09.pdf Previous Next Contact

News Pennsylvania Supreme Court Weighing Bad Faith (PA) November 27, 2019 < Back Share to: Back in April, we noted all eyes were on the PA Supreme Court to further clarify the bad faith standard with respect to insurance coverage in the lawsuit captioned: Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. On Thursday, November 21, oral arguments were finally held in this matter. During arguments, the PA Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the PA Superior Court abused its discretion by reweighing evidence relied upon by the trial court in its finding of bad faith on the part of an insurance carrier. By way of background, this lawsuit stems from a 1996 car accident involving Sharon Berg which led to well over a decade of litigation between Berg and her automobile insurer. The insurance company chose to send the vehicle for repairs rather than deem it totaled. Berg sued her insurer on the premise that the repairs were defective and the car was no longer crashworthy. One of the hotly contested issues became whether the insurer had, in bad faith, decided to repair the vehicle because it was half the cost of rendering it totaled, although the car was in fact totaled. A Berk’s County jury found almost entirely in favor of the insurer and only found it should pay $295 for violating the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. However, the trial judge found bad faith on the part of the insurer and added $18M in punitive damages and $3M in counsel fees to Berg’s verdict. Specifically, the trial judge cited to the insurer’s later decision to deem the car totaled, its failures to disclose information about the vehicle’s condition, abusing the discovery process, and its failure to negotiate in good faith. On appeal, the Superior Court found the evidence relied upon by the trial judge to be unconvincing and reversed the trial court’s verdict. Specifically, it found that there was no evidence that the insurer knew the vehicle was not safe to be put back on the road nor that it acted in bad faith, stating, “The trial court simply ignored a large body of evidence that rendered is finding unsupported.” In addition, the appellate court found bias on the part of the trial judge because of language in the judge’s opinion that appeared to condemn the insurance industry in broad terms. On Thursday, the PA Supreme heard oral arguments after granting Berg’s appeal. It will issue its decision on, among other things, whether the appellate court abused its discretion “by reweighing and disregarding clear and convincing evidence introduced in the trial court upon which the trial court relied to enter a finding of insurance bad faith.” Continue to stay tuned for the PA Supreme Court’s ruling and its impact on PA bad faith litigation. Thank you to Priscilla Torres for her contribution to this post. Please email Colleen E. Hayes with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Conclusory Allegations of Bad Faith Against Insurer Insufficient to Survive Motion to Dismiss (PA) January 8, 2021 < Back Share to: Recently, in Daniel Dietz v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether the factual averments in the plaintiff’s complaint were sufficient to overcome Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s partial motion to dismiss Dietz’s bad faith claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). By way of brief background, Dietz was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a driver who was insured by Farmers’ Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Dietz was insured under an automobile policy issued by Liberty. On behalf of Dietz, Liberty obtained a settlement; unfortunately, the settlement was insufficient to cover all of Dietz’s medical expenses from the accident. Accordingly, Dietz submitted an underinsured motorist claim (“UIM”) with Liberty, which Liberty ultimately denied. Subsequently, Liberty offered to settle the UIM claim; however, Dietz rejected the proposed settlement as he believed Liberty erroneously did not obtain an additional stacking waiver when Dietz added a fifth vehicle to his automobile policy. After Liberty denied Dietz’s request for a copy of Liberty’s underwriting file, Dietz commenced the instant action, alleging claims for a declaratory judgment, breach of contract and bad faith. In support of its motion to dismiss, Liberty argued Dietz failed to state a bad faith claim upon which relief can be granted. In consideration of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371 through the lens of the Court’s well-established standard of review, the Court determined Dietz failed to plead a claim for bad faith as the complaint contained no factual content indicating Liberty lacked a reasonable basis for denying his claim and that Dietz failed to show it either knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis. In addition, the Court concluded Dietz’s complaint, as pleaded, asks the Court to infer Liberty’s motive in refusing to produce its underwriting file was to deceive Dietz. Further, the Court cited other reasons why Liberty could have refused to produce a copy of its underwriting file, such as the fact that underwriting files often contain confidential business information. As the Court held the complaint failed to make any real factual averments, the Court granted Liberty’s motion and dismissed Dietz’s claim for bad faith. Ultimately, this case is a reminder of impact motions to dismiss can have on litigation in federal courts, and the premium courts place on well-pled complaints. Thanks to Lauren Berenbaum for her contribution to this post. Please contact Heather Aquino with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Pennsylvania Court Grants Summary Judgment and Enforces “Loading or Unloading of Persons” Coverage Limitation September 10, 2026 < Back Share to: Wade Clark Mulcahy LLP is pleased to announce that Executive Partner Robert J. Cosgrove and Associate Caroline G. Nelson secured a summary judgment on behalf of an insurer in a Pennsylvania insurance coverage declaratory judgment action arising from injuries allegedly sustained during medical transportation. The dispute stemmed from an underlying personal injury action alleging that the claimant was injured while being removed from a transport vehicle for a scheduled medical appointment. Following the underlying lawsuit, WCM commenced a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine whether the policy’s “Loading or Unloading of Persons” limitation applied to the claim and restricted available coverage for the insured. This coverage dispute raised a consequential question before the court: Did the policy’s limitation apply to injuries sustained while the claimant was being removed from the vehicle? WCM argued that the allegations fell within the plain language of the policy limitation and therefore restricted the coverage available for the claim. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granted summary judgment in favor of WCM’s client, holding that the policy limitation applied because the alleged injuries occurred during the unloading of the claimant from the transport vehicle. The court also denied a co-defendant nursing facility’s cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissed its cross-claims for contribution and indemnification. This decision reinforces the Pennsylvania courts’ practice of enforcing clear and unambiguous policy limitations according to their plain language and highlights the importance of examining the underlying complaint and its allegations when determining the scope of coverage and applicability of policy endorsements and sublimits. For insurers, the decision illustrates how carefully drafted policy limitations impact coverage outcomes and potential exposure when claims involve specialized risks. While clear and specific language helps define the circumstances that trigger a limitation, early analysis of the underlying allegations under the policy language allows insurers to identify applicable restrictions and assess potential exposure. Previous Next Robert J. Cosgrove Robert J. Cosgrove Executive Partner +1 267 239 5526 rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com Contact

News Criminal Penalties for "Tweeting" Jurors August 12, 2011 < Back Share to: We have reported on several occasions about how social media has been slowly changing the legal landscape, particularly in terms of instructions to be given to jurors during trial proceedings. While judges must always instruct jurors not to communicate with anyone about the pending proceedings, jurors have continuously failed to comprehend that the judge's instructions also apply to Facebook and twitter. California has decided to be proactive about such juror actions, and is amending its jury instruction to include a prohibition against "any form of electronic or wireless communication." Violators potentially face six months in jail. New York was a bit ahead of the game on this issue as it revised its jury instructions in May 2009. A "tweeting juror" in NY can be charged with criminal contempt, and very nearly was in the case of People v. Rios, 2010 WL 625221 (N.Y. Sup., 2010) during a well publicized arson trial in Bronx County. Thanks to Biran Gibbons for his contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News In NY, a Tender Requires Support. August 12, 2011 < Back Share to: In Admiral Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the plaintiff insurer sought a declaration that the defendant insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify plaintiff P&K Contracting in the underlying personal injury action. The relevant facts of that tender are as follows. In October 2002, an employee of Shahid Enterprises, a subcontractor retained by P&K, was injured when he fell from a ladder. In 2003, the employee commenced a lawsuit. On September 22, 2003, United Claims Service, as authorized representatives of the plaintiff, sent a tender letter to Shahid demanding defense and indemnification. On December 17, 2003, UCS sent Shahid a follow up letter with copies to State Farm, Shahid’s insurer. In the letter, UCS did not indicate when it first received notice of the incident or lawsuit. State Farm claimed it did not receive this letter until January 22, 2004, because the letter was forwarded to an inactive claims office. On February 5, 2004, State Farm wrote to UCS and P&K requesting a copy of the file since it had no information on the accident. On March 19, 2004, State Farm sent UCS, plaintiff, P&K, and Shahid a letter wherein it reserved its right to deny defense and indemnity based on late notice. By letter dated April 13, 2004—now 113 days after UCS’ December 17, 2003 follow up letter—State Farm disclaimed coverage based on P&K’s failure to give prompt notice. Both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment and both motions were denied, as the Supreme Court found that triable issues of fact existed as to whether State Farm disclaimed coverage as soon as was reasonably possible. In affirming the trial court's decision, the First Department focused on the fact that the December 17, 2003 follow up letter did not provide State Farm with any information regarding when P&K received notice of the incident or suit, and thus did not make it “readily apparent” that State Farm had the right to disclaim coverage. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted its disapproval of the policy of disclaiming now and investigating later. The moral of the story is -- if you're pressing a tender, make sure you provide enough information for the tender to be analyzed. Otherwise, you're going to be fighting a long legal battle. Special thanks to Gabe Darwick for his contributions to this post. For more information about it, or WCM's coverage practice, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News Mediation Agreements Are Binding in NJ. August 12, 2011 < Back Share to: In the case of Willingboro Mall v. 240/242 Franklin Avenue, et al., the plaintiff appealed from an order enforcing a settlement reached during a mediation session conducted pursuant to Rule 1:40-4. Plaintiff argued that the rule precludes enforcement of an oral settlement reached at a nonbinding mediation session. It also contended the alleged settlement was the product of coercion by the mediator. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows. Plaintiff and defendants were commercial real estate entities who were involved in a default and foreclosure dispute. The parties were referred to mediation by the General Equity judge. The parties selected a retired Superior Court Judge as mediator, and attended a mediation session with their attorneys at the office of defendants' attorney. After several hours, the parties agreed to a settlement. Counsel for defendants then wrote a letter to the General Equity judge to inform him that the parties had reached a settlement. The letter also stated the terms of the settlement. Plaintiff refused to consummate the settlement and instead asserted that a final, binding settlement agreement had not been reached at the mediation session. Defendants then filed a motion to enforce the mediated settlement agreement, and supported the motion with a certification of their attorney and the mediator. A plenary hearing was conducted and a written opinion was issued, which found that the parties did in fact arrive at a settlement of the underlying case, and that the settlement was therefore binding. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Rule 1:40-4(i) prevented enforcement of an oral settlement because the terms of the settlement were not reduced to writing at the mediation session, a copy of the writing was not provided to each party, and the parties did not affix their signatures to the writing at the mediation session. In addition, plaintiff argued that enforcement of a settlement reached at a mediation session is contrary to the non-binding nature of the mediation process. The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court. It ruled that mediation is utilized to afford the parties an opportunity to present their position before an experienced professional with the goal of resolving some or all of the differences between the parties. Rule 1:40-4 (i) does not prohibit the mediator or one of the parties from reducing the terms of the agreement to writing shortly after conclusion of the mediation session as occurred in this case. Specifically, the court noted that in this case, three days after the mediation session, defendants' attorney prepared and sent a letter stating the terms of the agreement reached by the parties. Two weeks later, he sent another letter informing plaintiff that he had placed the sum required to resolve the dispute in an escrow account. The Appellate Court held that these writings, the first memorializing the terms of the settlement and the second notifying plaintiff of defendants' action to consummate the settlement, were within the intention of the rule requiring the agreement to be reduced to writing. Two important points bear mention here. First, sometimes attorneys (and litigants) are held to their word and bound by their verbal actions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, know your case and the attorneys. If the attorneys on the other side seem like the kind of folks who will try to weasel their way out of an agreement, don’t leave the mediation until a written agreement is finalized and signed by all parties. It might take a little bit longer, but it’s certainly worth the effort – in fact, we just did this on a case on Wednesday where a post mediation “agreement on written terms” seemed like it might be hard to come by. But that’s a story for a different day… Special thanks to Sheila Osei for her contributions to this post. For more information about it, or WCM's NJ practice, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News Pennsylvania Court Holds Auto Carriers Subject To Bad Faith Statute February 15, 2011 < Back Share to: < ![CDATA[Pennsylvania Court Holds Auto Carriers Subject To Bad Faith Statute]]> Previous Next Contact