Wade Clark Mulcahy LLP

In a previous post we looked at the “assured clear distance” rule under Pennsylvania law (see https://www.wcmlaw.com/news/better-to-have-an-%22assured-clear-distance%22-than-20%2F20-hindsight-in-pennsylvania). But is the requirement that “a motorist [must be] capable of stopping within the distance that he can clearly see….” Springer v. Luptowski, 635 A.2d 134, 136 (Pa. 1993), all there is to say on the matter of a rear-end collision? Of course not! If you have already gone through the trouble of familiarizing yourself with the assured clear distance rule, you might as well familiarize yourself with Pennsylvania’s “sudden emergency doctrine.”

Far from being a rule which would absolve one of having to conduct oneself with prudence, the doctrine “does not relieve one of all responsibility to act with reasonable care to avoid an accident and thus, unlike an affirmative defense, the sudden emergency doctrine need not be pled under Pa.R.C.P. 1030(b).” Shiner v. Ralston, 2013 PA Super 33, 64 A.3d 1, 4 (2013). Instead, it is “a legal principle that provides that an individual will not be held to the usual degree of care or be required to exercise his or her best judgment when confronted with a sudden and unexpected position of peril created in whole or in part by someone other than the person claiming protection under the doctrine.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In short, the sudden emergency doctrine “lowers the standard of care for a party confronted with a sudden and unforeseeable occurrence.” Sweigart v. Voyager Trucking Corp., No. 23-2397, 2024 WL 3565306, at *3 (3d Cir. July 29, 2024).[1]

This doctrine would seem then to be at odds with the assured clear distance rule and in fact Pennsylvania courts have noted that exact sentiment:

Generally, a jury should not be instructed on both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine since the two are mutually exclusive. This is based on the rationale that the assured clear distance ahead rule applies to essentially static or static objects including vehicles moving in the same direction, while the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver's path of travel.

Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 331 (PA Super 2014) (quoting Cunningham v. Byers, 732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa.Super.1999)). Nonetheless, a jury may be instructed as to both doctrines depending on the circumstances of a case. While “a person cannot avail himself of the protection of [the sudden emergency] doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly” because “a person confronted with a sudden and unforeseeable occurrence, because of the shortness of time in which to react, should not be held to the same standard of care as someone confronted with a foreseeable occurrence” Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995), both doctrines might appropriately be explained to a jury. For example, in Lockhart, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that because the plaintiff’s excessive speed was not determined as a matter of law, the decision of the lower court to withhold the instruction to the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine was improper. Id. at 1182. Additionally, the Supreme Court found “that the lower courts' rigid adherence to the distinction between static or fixed versus moving objects was here in error.” Id. This was because the evidence was unclear as to whether the object the plaintiff struck, in this case another vehicle, “was actually stationary at the time of the collision” and thus “on that basis alone” the jury should have been charged with the sudden emergency doctrine.

Moreover, the Court included that even if the truck had been stationary, the “reliance” of the lower court “upon that fact was misplaced.” As a general matter the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed generally with the Superior Court’s distinction between fixed and moving objects since it is quite reasonable to hold a person accountable for colliding with a stationary object on the road which is, and has been, in plain view for everyone to see, while it is quite a distinct matter when an object or instrumentality suddenly moves into the path of an oncoming vehicle.

Id. at 1182. Nonetheless, the Court stated that it did not “believe it to be as inflexible” as the lower court had applied it and because the precept underlying this distinction is that a driver who, if driving prudently, could have or would have seen the obstacle in the roadway, whether it was moving or stationary, the distinction is rendered meaningless where the evidence, at least arguably, suggests either that the driver would not have seen the obstacle in time to avoid a collision and/or would not have reasonably foreseen the occurrence of the obstacle, even if prudent.”

Id. at 1182 – 1183.

The upshot of this is that in any given case the two differing doctrines might be mutually exclusive. However, whether the two doctrines are deemed mutually exclusive or applied concurrently will depend on the material facts of the case.

[1] The “sudden emergency doctrine” should not be confused with the “sudden medical emergency doctrine”.