News Uniquely Dangerous Condition at Water Park Can't be Assumed (NY) October 18, 2012 < Back Share to: Anyone who has ever been to a water park appreciates there are a lot of different ways to get hurt. But recently, in Mussara v. Mega Funworks, a New York appellate court held that because the type of dangerous condition was "unique," plaintiff's lawsuit was not barred by the assumption of risk doctrine and could proceed. As the plaintiff exited the water slide, he was thrown across a 50-foot pool and hit the cement on the other side. The water park argued that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury when he rode the slide. The park posted a warning sign and the plaintiff admitted that he checked the sign but did not read the warning. Nevertheless, the court ruled against the water park and held that the assumption of risk doctrine does not apply where the dangerous condition posed by the ride is unique and is "over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in riding down a water slide." In this case, the court ruled, the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of being thrown across a pool because there was no evidence that he was aware of that possibility. Indeed, the Court list a number of potential ways that a person might expect to get hurt at a water park, but this wasn't one of them. Rather, the plaintiff only assumed the risk that he would be injured despite the slide working as intended. Thanks to Mendel Simon for his contribution to this post. If you would like further information, please write to mbono@wcmlaw.com     Previous Next Contact

News Unleashing Liability: Understanding Landlord Responsibility for Tenant Dog-Related Injuries December 15, 2023 < Back Share to: Is a landlord liable for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog to another who is on the property of the landlord? Not always, says the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Here’s why. West Penn, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation owns land used for trap and target shooting. Goodenow v. McMahan , 297 A.3d 731 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023), (reargument denied (June 26, 2023)). Defendant Ronald McMahan (“McMahan”) is the president and groundskeeper for West Penn and would work at the trap range during trapshooting events. Id . McMahan “always had a dog living with him, and the West Penn board members have always known that McMahan kept dogs on the property, although there was never any discussion about how he should handle them when other groups were utilizing the West Penn site.” Id . McMahan lived on the West Penn property and had a fenced area where he would keep his dog secure. Id . McMahan was unaware of “any incidents or reports to West Penn” that his dog “ever exhibited aggressive tendencies.” Id . McMahan’s dog was known to “interact with other West Penn club members’ dogs, adults, and young children.” Id . The plaintiffs Teresa and Donald Goodenow (“Goodenows”) were attending a trapshooting event at West Penn. They decided to camp on the property and had brought their dog. The Goodenows claimed that McMahan’s dog had attempted to attack their own dog. Id . On July 11, 2015, after the trapshooting event was finished, the Goodenows were socializing outside of their camper with their dog and McMahan was also socializing in a group with his unleashed dog. Id . The Goodenows describe what happened thereafter as McMahan’s dog appearing suddenly at their campsite, grabbing their dog by the head. Id . As one man pulled McMahan’s dog by her collar, T. Goodenow “jumped from her own chair and grabbed [her dog], tripping and falling with the dog in her arms, allegedly resulting in injuries.” Id . Subsequently, D. Goodenow chased McMahan’s dog away. Id . The Goodenows, under the impression that the incident would be relayed to West Penn, did not fill out an accident report. Id . Thereafter, the Goodenows filed claims “asserting negligence for West Penn’s violation of its duty to provide a safe environment and failing to require McMahan to either remove his dog from the property or to keep his dog restrained, as well as a loss of consortium claim….” Id . After discovery, West Penn filed a motion for summary judgment “on the basis that it was an out-of-possession landlord” and that the Goodenows “failed to produce evidence that it had actual notice of [McMahan’s dog’s] alleged vicious propensities.” Id . (internal quotations omitted). In response, the Goodenows argued that because McMahan was the president of West Penn, the knowledge cold be imputed to West Penn and that West Penn had its own independent duties and that the Goodenows were not “merely propounding a vicarious liability/respondate [sic] superior theory against West Penn. Id . The trial court granted West Penn’s motion for summary judgment because the Goodenows had presented no evidence of a dangerous propensity for McMahan’s dog. The Goodenows appealed and argue that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether McMahan’s dog had exhibited dangerous propensities. Id . Ultimately, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s decision. In doing so, the Superior Court stated that “[g]enerally, in negligence actions arising from the conduct of animals, the animal’s owner is the person responsible for injuries to others caused by his or her pet. … In order to establish a cause of action in negligence against a landlord for injuries caused by his tenant's4 dog, it must be proven that the landlord had “actual knowledge that his tenant harbors a dog with dangerous propensities.” Id (internal quotations and citation omitted). Likewise,the Superior Court relied upon the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s description of a dangerous or vicious propensity; “[a] dangerous propensity includes a propensity or tendency of an animal to do any act that might endanger the safety of the person and property of others in a given situation.” Id . (internal citation omitted). In order to establish a cause of action in negligence against a landlord for injuries caused by his tenant’s dog, it must be proven that the landlord had actual knowledge that his tenant harbors a dog with dangerous propensities. Id . Internal quotations omitted). Simply stated, “prior to the ten to fifteen second July 8, 2015 interaction, there had never been any complaints to McMahan or West Penn about [McMahan’s dog’s] behavior, vicious or otherwise, and McMahan had not observed any violent behavior by [his dog] with any dog or person.” Id . What’s the takeaway from this? The lesson for landlords being sued for the acts of a tenant’s dog is that just because a landlord knows that a tenant has a dog does not mean that the landlord has actual knowledge of a dangerous propensity of that dog. Though the Goodenow Court’s decision is non-precedential, it is nonetheless an indicator of how any court might rule given a similar set of circumstances. Goodenow v. McMahan .pdf Download PDF • 179KB Previous Next Ryan Hunsicker Ryan Hunsicker Senior Associate +1 267 239 5526 rhunsicker@wcmlaw.com Contact

News Pennsylvania’s Doctrine of Hills and Ridges Delivers Questions of Fact to the Jury (PA) October 8, 2020 < Back Share to: In Figuero v. Meitzner, the Plaintiff, a delivery driver for Fed-Ex, slipped on an icy sidewalk while delivering a package to the Defendant. The Plaintiff sought damages and the jury held the Plaintiff 40% liable and the Defendant 60% liable, awarding $1.5 million in damages to the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, arguing the jury had insufficient evidence to support the findings that the Defendant was 60% liable. The Defendant argued that the Pennsylvania’s Common Law Doctrine of Hills and Ridges was in effect, and therefore relieved the Defendant of liability. Defendant based this argument on evidence established at trial that general slippery conditions were existent in the town of Bethlehem the morning of Plaintiff’s fall. During trial, Plaintiff testified it had snowed that morning and there was a light blanket of snow and ice where she fell. But Plaintiff had also testified it stopped snowing while she delivered packages, and she delivered many other packages without incident. The court noted that unless slippery conditions generally existed throughout the town, the court, as a matter of law, would not need to consider whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy the Doctrine of Hills and Ridges. The Doctrine only applies when general slippery conditions prevail in the community. Tonik v. Apex Garages, Inc., 275 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. 1971). The Court denied the Defendant’s Motion for a Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict, in that the general condition throughout town the morning of the fall was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Here, the jury had the right to decide whether non-slippery conditions generally existed in Bethlehem on the morning in question, and if so, whether hills and ridges were present at the location of the fall. This case demonstrates the jury’s role in analyzing the many elements which factor into determining the application of the Doctrine of Hills and Ridges. Additionally, it is important to note a morning snowfall does not alleviate a landowner from liability. Landowners should be aware as to ice and snow on sidewalks, and understand a morning coat of snow could still end in $1.5 million in damages. Thanks to Madeline Troutman for her contribution to this post. Any questions, please contact Georgia Coats Previous Next Contact

News Communication with Your Client is Key (NY) March 15, 2019 < Back Share to: In Amerally v. Liberty King Produce, Inc. the Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s order, granting defendant’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement and denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate the settlement agreement. The plaintiff tripped and fell over a hose outside of a store owned by the defendant. The plaintiff then commenced this action and while the action was pending, the attorneys for both parties participated in a mediation and signed an agreement resolving the matter for the sum of $150,000. However, when the defendant sent the plaintiff the settlement agreement, the plaintiff refused to execute, and the defendant moved to enforce it. The plaintiff then obtained a new attorney and cross-moved to vacate the settlement agreement on the ground that she never provided her former attorney with the authority to settle the action for the sum of $150,000 and that she was unaware that a settlement had been reached until several weeks after the mediation. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff’s cross motion. The defendant appealed. The court affirmed, holding that stipulations of settlements are favored by the court and further stating that when a settlement agreement is in writing and signed by a client or attorney, it should be considered binding on both parties. In addition, the court held that a stipulation may bind a party even where it exceeds the attorney’s actual authority, if the attorney had apparent authority to enter into the stipulation. Here, it was demonstrated that the plaintiff knew that her former attorney was participating in the mediation. Moreover, even if the attorney lacked the actual authority to enter into the settlement agreement, a finding could still be made of apparent authority. In addition, the party seeking to set aside the stipulation must prove that it was unfair or one sided. Thus, the case reveals that it is important to keep open communication to avoid unnecessary headaches and motion practice. Thanks to Nicole Lyalin for her contribution to this post. Please email Vito A. Pinto with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Late Notice of Tort Claim Approved? Not So Fast (NJ) April 2, 2021 < Back Share to: In New Jersey, a plaintiff sought to file a late notice of tort claim identifying a police officer that she claimed was responsible for her injuries. The plaintiff in Pagan v. Rivera sought help from the police department when she was threatened by a former boyfriend in violation of an Order of protection. Despite plaintiff’s concerns that the former boyfriend could be hiding in her apartment, the responding officer instructed her to go into the building to retrieve her identification and a copy of the Order. The plaintiff’s fears proved accurate, and she was assaulted inside the building. In New Jersey, the Torts Claims Act requires that persons who have claims against public entities or their employees provide a notice of the claim within ninety (90) days. While the plaintiff filed a timely notice, she failed to properly name the responding officer. Although her complaint was filed in Federal Court, the plaintiff filed motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim in New Jersey Superior Court. The motion was granted. On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion, and that the motion should have been filed in Federal Court. The court also determined that the defendant was entitled to oral argument on the motion, and that the trial court improperly decided the motion on the papers. This matter confirms that a defendant should always ensure that a court has jurisdiction for all pleadings and motions. Additionally, a defendant should always push for, and insist on, oral argument for important decisions. Please contact Heather Aquino with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Release From Insured Does Not Bar Claims By Co-insurer (NJ) September 19, 2013 < Back Share to: We previously posted about Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Assoc. Ins., where the Appellate Division found that an insurer can pursue another carrier of a common insured for contribution to defense costs despite settlement by one insurer of the insured’s claim. Now, the New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld the decision allowing a claim of contribution as between two insurers sharing in the defense costs of a common insured. The underlying case involves a claim by the Evesham Board of Education against its general contractor, Aristone, for allegedly defective construction in the building of the school. Because the loss spanned a number of years, Aristone was insured by multiple carriers. One of those carriers, Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association (PMA) disclaimed coverage, leading to a separate declaratory judgment action between Aristone and PMA. PMA settled with Aristone for what it considered to be its share of defense costs and indemnity, in exchange for a release from its insured. The settlement of the DJ prompted a settlement of the underlying case with the Board of Education. But the carriers that had provided a defense, including One Beacon, looked to PMA to contribute to the defense costs. Taking the position that the settlement agreement with the insured shielded it from any claims of contribution for defense costs from any of the other insurers, PMA refused to pay, resulting in this litigation. In upholding the Appellate Division’s ruling awarding a share of defense costs to OneBeacon by PMA, the Supreme Court determined the terms of PMA’s settlement with the insured did not consider or extinguish OneBeacon’s right to assert a claim for contribution. Of note was the fact that One Beacon was not a party to the PMA settlement agreement with the insured, and the language of the agreement did not address One Beacon's contribution rights. In a case of first impression for the Supreme Court, the Court highlighted several public policy issues: the value in conservation of financial resources and efficient dispute resolution, as well as the incentive for carriers to actively participate in litigation involving an insured. It seemed apparent that the Court would have preferred that the insurers handled this matter globally rather than with parallel litigation. Thanks to Emily Kidder for her contribution to this post. If you would like more information, please write to Mike Bono. Previous Next Contact

News Duty of Care as to Open and Obvious Dangers is not always Open and Obvious August 16, 2024 < Back Share to: In Robinson v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort, Inc. , Plaintiff Robinson was a business invitee at Seven Springs, playing a round of disc golf when she slipped on a steep slope consisting of loose gravel, and fractured her ankle. Seven Springs field a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Robinson “failed to present prima facie evidence that Seven Springs owed a duty of care to her because the condition of the hillside was obvious.” See 2024 WL 2955263, at 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 12, 2024). The trial court granted Seven Springs' Motion for Summary Judgment, stating “the natural condition was known and obvious” since Ms. Robinson knew “she was traversing a steep slope with patches of rocky and loose dirt.” Id. at 3. On appeal, the court reversed Seven Springs' Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that there was a question of material fact as to whether the hazard was open and obvious. The Court explained that, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, “Seven Springs is not relieved of its duty of care for open and obvious dangers when it has reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.” Id. at 5. The Court explained that Robinson’s testimony about the condition of the loose rocks was not “unquestionably obvious.” Id. at 4. Lastly, the Court reasoned that Seven Springs could anticipate that “any invitee's attention may be distracted while playing disc golf and attempting to retrieve discs mid-play.” Id. at *5. Robinson v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort Inc. .pdf Download PDF • 174KB Previous Next Contact

News N.J. Business Owners May Have Duty to Inspect Off-Site Parking Lots Regardless of Ownership June 8, 2012 < Back Share to: A recent N.J. Appellate Division case analyzed whether business owners have a duty to provide patrons with a safe pathway to an offsite parking lot owned by others. In Ciarrocca v. Ferrugia Associates, et. al., defendant (funeral home) had an agreement with two adjacent businesses to use their parking lots when their lots became full. Defendant also hired an off-duty police officer to manage traffic. The officer testified that he was instructed by the defendant to direct patrons to other off-site parking lots onShawnee Drive for which defendant did not have permission to use. Plaintiff was directed to park at one of theShawnee Drive lots and used a sidewalk to get to defendant’s premises. When returning to her car via the same route, she slipped on black ice, fell and seriously injured her leg. Defendant later moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court ruled in their favor and again on reconsideration. The Appellate Division noted generally that landowners have a duty to prevent injury to visitors from dangerous conditions and to warn of hazards. Business-owners in particular have a duty to remove hazards such as snow and ice from ways of access to their establishment. Case law also instructs that business owners have no duty in areas where they lack both ownership and control. While agreeing with the “ownership and control” analysis utilized by the lower Court, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision finding a limited duty only if the plaintiff herself had chosen where she parked. Although the defendant could not remedy the condition near the Shawnee Lot, it had a duty to perform a reasonable inspection and warn guests of hazardous conditions or to avoid the site if they directed patrons to park onShawnee Drive. The matter was remanded to the trial court to determine whether defendant in fact instructed the officer to direct traffic to theShawnee Drive lot and whether the black ice could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection. Thanks to Andrew Marra for this post. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Paul at pclark@wcmlaw.com   Previous Next Contact

News Happy Holidays from Wade Clark Mulcahy December 22, 2022 < Back Share to: Another year in the books! 2022 saw in person litigation begin to come back in earnest (thank goodness), but looking forward, we won't be cancelling our Teams/Zoom accounts any time soon -- some degree of remote conferencing is certainly here to stay. WCM continues to enjoy growth, in large part due to the loyalty of our friends and clients within and without the United States. We look forward to our continued collaboration in 2023 and beyond. And a special thanks to the support staff at our WCM offices, who keep the WCM train on its tracks every day. Please accept our Holiday E-Card, and our best wishes for a a Happy and Healthy Holiday Season! Previous Next Contact

News Does Unloading Gas Line Pipes Off A Trailer Fall Under §240(1) Of The Labor Law? (NY) April 21, 2023 < Back Share to: Section 240 of New York Labor Law involves liability for injuries of construction workers who suffer a fall or are struck by a falling object. Liability is contingent upon the existence of an elevation hazard contemplated in §240(1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device. In Castano v. Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, 213 A.D.3d 905 (2d Dep’t 2023), the Appellate Division, Second Department recently addressed whether §240(1) applied in a case where a worker was injured while working on a project to replace a section of an interstate natural gas pipeline beneath the Hudson River. Plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident, he was unloading pipes that weighed approximately 1,000 pounds each from a flatbed trailer. After he secured one of the pipes with a “choker” strap, a coworker lifted the pipe using a CAT excavator, the pipe dropped and struck the plaintiff’s leg. Plaintiff sued the pipeline owner and general contractor asserting various Labor Law claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the Labor Law §240 (1) claim, and plaintiff cross-moved on the issue of liability under the same provision. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, denied plaintiff’s cross-motion, and plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court granting defendants’ motion as to the §240(1) claim, holding that the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact concerning that claim. In reaching its determination and focusing on applicability of the statute to falling objects, the Court reasoned that a plaintiff must show when the object fell it was being hoisted, secured, or needed securing for purposes of the undertaking. Further, the Court determined that a plaintiff must also show the object fell because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute. With these considerations, the Court found the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. This case serves as a reminder that while certain tasks such as removing items off a flatbed trailer may not seem to fall within the purview of the Labor Law, accidents involving falling objects can trigger liability and courts will examine the facts to determine whether a plaintiff can meet the statutory requirements. Please contact John Diffley with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News U.S. Supreme Court Re-Writes the Rules of Personal Jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. July 14, 2023 < Back Share to: Perhaps overshadowed by landmark opinions in other areas, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision concerning personal jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk may dramatically impact the nature of civil litigation against out-of-state defendants across the nation. Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a claim against a certain entity. Generally, plaintiffs in civil claims can establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (1) the defendant is “at home” in the forum state meaning they are incorporated or headquartered there (referred to as “general” jurisdiction); or (2) the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state such that defending would not threaten “traditional notions of fair play and justice,” referred to as “specific” jurisdiction. However, Mallory upheld a Pennsylvania law that requires any entity registering to do business in the state to consent to the general jurisdiction of the state’s courts, potentially subjecting businesses to general jurisdiction in any state where it registers to do business. In Mallory, the plaintiff worked as a freight mechanic with Norfolk Southern Railway Co. (“Norfolk”) in Ohio and Virginia for twenty years, and then briefly moved to Pennsylvania until his diagnosis with cancer. After moving back to Virginia, Mallory sued Norfolk for alleged workplace injuries in Pennsylvania court. In response, Norfolk argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction because Norfolk was not headquartered or incorporated in Pennsylvania and did not have sufficient contacts with the state. Norfolk also argued that the consent statute violated the Due Process Clause and that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Company, 243 U.S. 93 (1917), which found that a similar statute did not violate due process, had been overruled by subsequent cases addressing personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with Norfolk and held that the statute was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court majority disagreed, finding that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit states from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to being sued as a condition of doing business in the state. The Court found that it was irrelevant that Mr. Mallory no longer lived in Pennsylvania and was likely injured in Virginia and Ohio; instead, the Court acknowledged that entities like Norfolk can statutorily consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business in a state. The Court also found that the Pennsylvania Fire case had not been overruled and was controlling precedent. While some fear that the Mallory decision will allow plaintiffs to engage in “litigation tourism” and “forum shopping,” others predict that it may be subject to challenge. Three members of the Court joined Justice Barrett in dissent, opining that Pennsylvania’s registration law violates the Due Process Clause while Justice Alito noted in his concurrence that the law also raises Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. That issue was not addressed in the decision and may form the basis for a subsequent challenge. Nonetheless, the decision will likely result in other states passing similar laws and expand the ability of states to obtain general jurisdiction over foreign and domestic companies doing business in multiple states. Thank you to Nicholas Ozorowski for his contribution to this post. Please contact Andrew Gibbs with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Kids for Cash Insurance Dispute Decided by Third Circuit. July 6, 2012 < Back Share to: We have previously reported on the Kids for Cash scandal. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a pair of district court rulings finding no coverage for developers involved in the scandal. In Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Mericle, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Travelers holding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Robert Mericle or Mericle Construction, Inc. for paying kickbacks to state judges. Mericle appealed, arguing that the underlying events constituted an “occurrence” under Coverage A and that the contractual exclusions for intentional acts under Coverage B were inapplicable as a matter of Pennsylvania law. In an opinion penned by Judge Anthony Scirica, the Third Circuit noted at the onset that coverage disputes in Pennsylvania are governed by the “four corners” rule that limits coverage to those allegations contained exclusively within the complaint. Under that rule, the facts alleged, not the pleaded cause of action, is determinative of coverage. As applied to the Coverage A issue, the Court explained that the term “occurrence” in an insurance contract turns on the fortuity of events and cannot exist when the facts indicate that the underlying incident was the expected or intended result of an insured’s actions. The Court therefore found Mericle’s argument that the complaint omitted an express allegation of intentional conduct unavailing in light of countless factual references in the complaint detailing the Luzerne conspiracy. In respect of the Coverage B issues, the Third Circuit easily found the insurance contract’s exculpatory provisions applicable. Under Coverage B, Travelers covenanted with Mericle to provide coverage for injuries arising out of offenses like false arrest, detention, or imprisonment, but also excepted from coverage injuries stemming from the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance. Despite these exclusions, Mericle argued that the complaint alleged negligence in addition to intentional acts, and that the penal statute and knowing violation exclusions did not apply to bar coverage. In support of its position, Mericle pointed to the language of the complaint where the plaintiffs alleged that defendants “knew or should have known” the effects of their conspiracy. The Court, however, remained unconvinced and held that notwithstanding the language of negligence, the facts alleged only intentional conduct. Moreover, the Court acknowledged Pennsylvania’s deep-seated public policy against providing insurance coverage for intentional acts and found Mericle’s conduct sufficient to trigger the penal statute and knowing violation exclusions. Similarly, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of no coverage in Colony Insurance Company v. Mid-Atlantic Youth Services (MAYS), another case arising out of the same judicial kickback scheme. In that case, MAYS and its owner Robert Powell were accused of paying $2.6 million to Luzerne County judges in exchange for favorable rulings that would remand juveniles to detention facilities managed by the defendants. In its appeal from the district court, MAYS mimicked the issues in Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Mericle and was equally unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals employed the same line of reasoning and ultimately found that under the “four corners” rule the facts of the complaint alleged intentional acts sufficient to trigger the insurance contract’s exclusions and deny the defendants the right to coverage. Special thanks to Adam Gomez for his contributions to this post. For more information, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com .   Previous Next Contact