Juhi R. Patel Law Clerk New York jpatel@wcmlaw.com (332) 345-4186 Professional Experience Juhi Patel is a Law Clerk in WCM’s New York office, where she assists with general liability litigation for various types of claims. Her work involves legal research and drafting litigation documents in support of insurer’s defense and indemnification obligations. As a law student, Juhi externed in legal departments across different industries. She served as a legal intern at the in-house legal departments of a gene therapy company, Spark Therapeutics, Villanova University’s Office of the Vice President and General Counsel, and a multi-media sports and entertainment company, Playfly Sports. Prior to law school, Juhi worked as a legal assistant at a personal injury firm in Somerville, NJ. Honors and Distinctions Villanova Law Dean’s Merit Scholar Professional Activities Villanova Law NovUs Young Alumni Board, Member News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law B.S. in Exercise Science & Sports Studies, Rutgers University, cum laude Bar Admissions

News Score One for the Insurers In Chinese Drywall. December 29, 2010 < Back Share to: We have previously reported on Chinese drywall claims and some of the consolidated lawsuits pending in New Orleans. One of these lawsuits, a coverage lawsuit, has been decided in the insurers’ favor -- http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Drywall/Orders/O&R.homeowners.insurance.pdf In this case, the court was faced with the issue of whether homeowner’s policies excluded coverage because of the faulty materials exclusion By way of background, the homeowners had argued that the faulty material exclusion did not apply because “the drywall was not faulty because it functioned properly as drywall.” The trial court disagreed. It held that “although [the] drywall serves its intended purpose as a room divider, wall anchor and insulator, the allegations in the complaints provide that the drywall emits foul-smelling odors and releases gases which damage silver and copper components in the home, including electrical devices, appliances and wiring.” Therefore, the court concluded, “the drywall sheets are faulty because the materials of which they are composed.” For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact

News Are TCPA Claims a Covered “Advertising Injury” Event? October 7, 2010 < Back Share to: In the case of Telecommunications Network Design and Paradise Distributing, Inc. v. The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company, Paradise was insured by Brethren. Between July 8, 2001 and July 8, 2003 (when Brethren was on risk), Paradise transmitted over 1,000,000 unsolicited advertising faxes – including one to Telecommunications Network Design. TND commenced a class action lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. TND argued that the unsolicited faxes imposed costs on TND and the other class members without authorization and thus demanded compensation. TND did not plead a violation of privacy claim and coverage was disclaimed as not constituting “advertising damages”. A declaratory judgment action ensued. In the action, Paradise argued that directly pleading a violation of privacy claim was unnecessary (to guarantee coverage) because the TCPA was enacted, in part, to protect privacy. In opposition, Brethren argued that the coverage trigger was, indeed, the pleading of a violation of privacy claim. The trial court ruled for Brethren and an appeal resulted. In the appeal, the PA Superior Court was confronted with the question of whether faxes, a written publication, “violated a person’s right of privacy” and thus triggered coverage. The Superior Court ruled -- http://www.superior.court.state.pa.us/opin.htm -- that sending of faxes in and of itself did not trigger coverage, but rather the “message in the materials” was central. It therefore upheld the trial court’s decision. Notably, in reaching its decision, the Superior Court specifically allowed the carrier to look outside the four corners of the complaint in making its coverage decision. If you would like more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News 911 Calls Regarding Roaming Pitbulls Did Not Create "Special Duty" on Part of City. August 16, 2012 < Back Share to: In Sutton v. City of New York, a 90 year old was mauled to death by two pitbulls that had been roaming the neighborhood for three months. The plaintiff claimed that repeated calls to the police by the decedent's neighbors and family regarding the roaming pitbulls put the City on notice of the damager, and created a "special duty" to protect the decedent from attack. The court found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements of the four part test to establish the "special duty." The elements are: (1) assumption by the municipality to act on behalf of the party that was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could result in injury; (3) direct contact between the potential victim and the municipality's agents, and (4) the party's reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking. Since the decedent did not make any calls on his own, and had no direct contact with city, there was no "affirmative duty" to act on his behalf. Accordingly, the court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. For more information about this post, please contact cfuchs@wcmlaw.com .   Previous Next Contact

News Tenant's Tying Up a Vicious Dog Could Place Liability on Landlord November 12, 2010 < Back Share to: In Jones v Pennsylvania Meat Mkt, the plaintiff was bitten on the leg by a pit bull dog near the rear entrance of a grocery store. At the time of the incident, the dog was tied to a store's dumpster. The store was located in a strip mall and the landlord retained security guards to patrol the property. The plaintiff testified he frequently saw the dog, which allegedly was owned by a store employee, tied to the dumpster. He also testified that the dog had a tendency to bark, growl, and strain against its leash to lunge at people who were passing by. In denying the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the court stated the the evidence raised triable issues of fact as to whether the landlord was aware that the dog was being harbored on its premises, whether the dog had vicious propensities, whether the landlord controlled the area where the incident occurred. http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07897.htm Previous Next Contact

News NJ Considering Legislation to Mandate Insurance Coverage for COVID-19 Pandemic March 26, 2020 < Back Share to: Alarming news in New Jersey regarding the legislature’s apparent intent to force insurers to provide coverage for BI claims with respect to the COVID-19 Pandemic. New Jersey is threatening to rewrite insurance policies to include the COVID-19 pandemic as a covered peril, regardless of the language and exclusions in the policy. This appears to attempt to force insurers which provide BI insurance to indemnify the insured for COVID-19 elated closures and losses. The bill, introduced as bill No. 3844, in its statement of rationale: This bill provides a mechanism by which certain businesses that suffer losses due to interruption as a result of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic may recover those losses from their insurer if they had a policy of business interruption insurance in force on March 9, 2020, the date on which the Governor declared a Public Health Emergency and State of Emergency in Executive Order 103. The bill would apply to businesses covered by such a policy with less than 100 eligible employees in the State of New Jersey. "Eligible employee" is defined as a full-time employee who works a normal work week of 25 or more hours The bill provides that every policy of insurance insuring against loss or damage to property, which includes the loss of use and occupancy and business interruption, in force on the date of the Executive Order, shall be construed to include among the covered perils under that policy coverage for business interruption due to global virus transmission or pandemic, as provided in the Governor’s Executive Order. The coverage provided would be subject to the limits under the policy and would indemnify the insured for losses incurred during the State of Emergency. The exact language of the bill is equally alarming: a. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule or regulation to the contrary, every policy of insurance insuring against loss or damage to property, which includes the loss of use and occupancy and business interruption in force in this State on the effective date of this act, shall be construed to include among the covered perils under that policy, coverage for business interruption due to global virus transmission or pandemic, as provided in the Public Health Emergency and State of Emergency declared by the Governor in Executive Order 103 of 2020 concerning the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. The bill later indicates that coverage is subject to policy limits. This bill, in current form, only would require insurers that wrote a policy that included coverage for business interruption or loss of use to indemnify the insured. Specifically, “[t]he coverage required by this section shall indemnify the insured” but only applies to companies with less than 100 employees. This bill has not yet passed, but it is alarming news for insurers who have written insurance policies that generally exclude from coverage losses due to a virus. Thanks to Matthew Care on his contribution to this post. Please email Georgia Coats with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News The Importance of a Comprehensive Disclaimer in NY March 9, 2009 < Back Share to: In 2002, Plaintiff Estee Lauder presented environmental claims to One Beacon Insurance Group under an insurance policy running from 1968-1971. Unable to locate sufficient evidence that such a policy ever existed, One Beacon rejected the claims, indicating it was terminating its investigation and closing its file. Apparently, it did not cite any other potential ground for disclaimer. Thereafter, further evidence of the existence of the policy surfaced and One Beacon attempted to assert a late notice defense. But the First Department held One Beacon waived its right to assert such a defense, as One Beacon was aware of the facts supporting that potential defense but failed to cite it in its 2002 letters to plaintiff. While the Court recognized that a late disclaimer will not create coverage where the existence of coverage cannot be established, that did not excuse an insurer's duty to timely assert all known defenses to a claim. The Court also held that a blanket reservation of rights allowing for a future disclaimer was insufficient, and that One Beacon's 2002 letters denying the claim served as disclaimers, despite the fact that the term "disclaimer" was not used. This decision serves as an important reminder that an insurer should always cite all applicable coverage defenses, even in cases where it is seems obvious that no coverage exists. Thanks to Stephanie Chen for her contribution. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_01313.htm Previous Next Contact

News Doctrine Of Res Judicata Not Applicable Where Dismissal Was Due To Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction January 4, 2012 < Back Share to: In Sumar v. Fox, the plaintiff had commenced a prior action that involved the same parties and identical causes of action. The defendants moved to dismiss that prior action due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff did not oppose the defendant's motion and it was granted on default. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the current action and the defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. However, the trial court held and the appellate court affirmed that the prior dismissal was neither with prejudice, nor was it on the merits and as such, the doctrine of res judicata would not apply. Thanks to Alison Weintraub for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

London Our Offices New York Pennsylvania New Jersey Florida Louisiana Texas Long Island London Wade Clark Mulcahy LLP – London WCM opened its London Office in October 2020 by WCM London Market Representative Jeff Weston. WCM’s London office focuses on serving and developing WCM’s client base in the London market and at Lloyd’s of London. Contact Details 100 Bishopsgate, London EC2N 4AG, UK +44 208 159 2544 N/A Attorneys and Professional Staff Mark Turner Market Representative

E. Alexis Bevis Partner Louisiana abevis@wcmlaw.com +1 504 291-2360 Professional Experience Alexis regularly handles cases in state and federal courts in Louisiana. Alexis’ primary areas of practice are defense of general casualty lines carriers focusing on casualty, commercial, and complex litigation in the fields of energy, manufacturing, highway engineering, transportation, construction negligence, premises liability, products liability, medical malpractice, cyber litigation, catastrophic loss, and coverage opinions. A snapshot of cases she has defended: • Successful defense of several premises liability claims regarding alleged parking lot and/or ingress and egress defects, as well as alleged defects within grocery stores and apartment complexes. • Successful defense of multiple cases involving alleged negligence by employees of family-owned tow truck companies on all types of Louisiana roadways. • Successful defense of alleged apartment complex negligence in the shooting deaths of two alleged visitors. • Successful defense of pile-driving activities that allegedly caused defects to adjacent property. • Successful defense of in excess of one-hundred-million-dollar exposure subrogation action against insurer of dissolved inspection company alleged to have been responsible for petroleum refinery fire and explosion. • Successful defense of child placement service for wrongful death of infant. • Successful defense of multi-million dollar exposure claim against engineering consultant alleged to have been responsible for the misperforation and failed recompletion of an oil well. • Successful defense of various State of Louisiana correctional facilities against claims of negligent bodily injury. • Successful defense of family services entity for molestation claims of two minors. • Successful defense of facility for the developmentally disabled for alleged rape claim of a developmentally disabled consumer by another developmentally disabled consumer. • Successful summary judgment upholding statutory employer defense on behalf of owner of multi-million dollar revitalization project. Professional Activities Louisiana State Bar Association New Orleans Bar Association News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Loyola University College of Law B.A., The Pennsylvania State University Bar Admissions Louisiana Court Admissions U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana U.S. District Court Western District of Louisiana U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida

News Reversal Where Evidence Did Not Support The Aggravation Of Pre Existing Injury Jury Charge. February 20, 2009 < Back Share to: Sheffer v. Sullivan was a NJ verbal tort threshold case tried on the issue of damages only. The primary issue was whether plaintiff's alleged back injury was a disc bulge or herniation and whether the injury was permanent. Testimony from various doctors confirmed that the plaintiff had a preexisting arthritic condition in her spine which was asymptomatic, however, no expert testified that the preexisting condition was aggravated by the accident. Over the objection of the defense attorney the Court gave the jury the aggravation charge and the jury awarded $175,000. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial finding that by submitting the aggravation charge to the jury, the trial court allowed the jury to award damages for an aggravation of a preexisting condition, despite the absence of sufficient evidence to support the claim. Since the verbal tort threshold required proof of a permanent back injury, the Court's mistake in allowing the jury to consider aggravation evidence was " capable of producing an unjust result, and constituted reversible error." http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a6601-06.pdf Previous Next Contact

News PA Appellate Court Finds that You’re “At Work” While on Your Commute April 8, 2022 < Back Share to: In Bark v. Sooner Steel LLC, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a worker was acting within the course and scope of his employment while commuting home from work. The court emphasized that whether someone is acting within the course and scope of his or her employment is a fact specific inquiry. In Bark, the claimant suffered severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident that occurred while he was returning home from work. Before the accident, the claimant, Mr. Bark, and his employer had agreed that he would be paid for the time he worked, as well as the commute. There was, however, no written contract. After the incident, Mr. Bark sought workers’ compensation benefits. The workers’ compensation board denied the claim, finding that the claimant was not acting within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. Under Pennsylvania law, commuting to and from work is not considered to be within the course and scope of one’s employment (commonly referred to as the “coming and going” rule). There are limited exceptions though. The exceptions are: (1) the employment contract includes transportation to and/or from work; (2) the claimant has no fixed place of work; (3) the claimant is on a “special assignment or mission” for the employer; or (4) special circumstances are such that the claimant was furthering the business of the employer. Each case is extremely fact intensive. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (an appellate tribunal), found that Mr. Bark was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court relied on the “humanitarian nature” of the Act. Further, it found that “course of employment” should be broadly construed when the employee is a traveling employee—as Mr. Bark was. Similarly, “course of employment” is broadly construed when there is no fixed place of work. Ultimately, the court determined that Mr. Bark suffered his injuries when while in the “course and scope” of his employment. Thanks to John Lang for his contribution to this article. Should you wish to discuss, please feel free to contact Tom Bracken. Previous Next Contact