News WCM is Pleased to Announce that James W. Scott, Jr. has been Promoted to Partner July 1, 2022 < Back Share to: Effective July 1, 2022, Jim Scott, who works in our Philadelphia office, has been promoted to partner. Jim is the current President of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and a past-President of the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel. As such he is the only attorney ever elected president of both defense organizations. Jim is a graduate of Duke University and Temple University School of Law. With 28 years of experience, Jim focuses his practice on the defense of construction defect, construction accident, premises liability, and products liability claims. Prior to becoming an attorney, Jim was the Assistant Director of Operations with the largest fabricator/erector of structural steel in the Delaware Valley. As such, his construction defect practice has been substantially enhanced by significant real world experience. Previous Next Contact

News Pennsylvania Court Provides Gateway for Insureds to Keep Lawsuits in State Court (PA) August 3, 2018 < Back Share to: The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently issued a decision that may help insureds interested in having their cases heard in state court rather than allowing those cases to be removed to federal court. In Dominque Ellis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al., a plaintiff defeated diversity by naming both the insurer and the claims adjuster as defendants. Initially, a lawsuit was brought by Dominique Ellis (“Ellis”) who was hit by a car while she was walking down the street. At the time, Ellis was insured by a Liberty Mutual auto insurance policy that listed her mother as the “named insured.” Since the motorist was underinsured, Ellis sought to recover medical expenses from Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual later denied her claim and Ellis sued both Liberty Mutual and the claims adjuster, Clare MacNabb (“MacNabb”). MacNabb was added to the lawsuit because Ellis claimed that she dragged her feet during a six-month investigation into whether Ellis lived at the address listed within the policy. Once MacNabb concluded that Ellis was being truthful about her address, she denied her claim on the ground that her medical expenses were less than the limit of the policy owned by the underinsured driver. Ellis alleged that the investigation was fraudulent and meant to intimidate her from pursuing her claim. Ellis’ lawsuit was brought in state court and consisted of three counts against Liberty Mutual: (1) an “underinsured motorist claim,” (2) a claim for bad faith insurance denial, and (3) a claim for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). The UTPCPL claim was also brought against MacNabb. As both Ellis and MacNabb were residents of Pennsylvania, there was no diversity of citizenship grounds to remove that case to federal court. However, Liberty Mutual argued that MacNabb was fraudulently joined and removed the case to federal court. As a result, Ellis moved to remand the matter back to state court. The District Court granted the motion to remand, rejecting all three reasons asserted by Liberty Mutual to support that MacNabb had been fraudulently joined. First, the Court explained that claims under the UTPCPL against claims adjusters were “colorable under Pennsylvania law.” Under the law, UTPCPL claims against individual insurance claims representatives were allowed. Second, the Court determined that it was too early to tell whether Ellis’s claim was for mere nonfeasance. Ellis’ complaint alleged nonfeasance by MacNabb in MacNabb taking too long to investigate her claim and ultimately denying coverage. However, a UTPCPL claim requires malfeasance, rather than nonfeasance. The Court determined that Ellis’ complaint also supported “an inference of malfeasance” in that the adjuster’s investigation was intended to intimidate or harass Ellis. According to the Court, malfeasance may exist if an insurer conducted a post-loss investigation in an unfair or unreasonable manner. The Court noted that, at this stage, Ellis still had the opportunity to prove malfeasance by MacNabb and that to dive further into this issue would require an assessment of the merits of the claim itself. Finally, the District Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s argument that Ellis cannot maintain a claim under the UTPCPL because she did not purchase the insurance policy herself. The UTPCPL grants a claim to any person who, among other requirements, purchases or leases goods or services. In the instant matter, Ellis’s mother was the purchaser and the named insured. However, the Court determined that, although support that Ellis herself purchased the policy was “admittedly slim,” it should remain mindful that “all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand” and that remand was required if there was even a possibility that a state court would find the complaint stated a claim against MacNabb. The District Court thus concluded that the “lenient standard” had been satisfied and that it remained unclear whether Ellis had been making payments under the insurance policy. As a result, Ellis’s motion to remand was granted. Thank you to Zhanna Dubinsky for her contribution to this post. Please email Vito A. Pinto with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Surgery Not Necessarily A Permanent Injury Under Tort Claims Act (NJ) November 16, 2017 < Back Share to: In a claim against a New Jersey public entity, a plaintiff must prove a permanent and substantial injury to permit recovery. Under the Torts Claims Act, public entities are immune from suits unless there is permanent loss of a body function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment. In Paz v. State of New Jersey, the plaintiff suffered injuries to her neck, back and shoulders after a trip and fall accident on a sidewalk at the Motor Vehicle Commission. She was diagnosed with cervical disc herniation, chronic neck pain, cervical neck pain, cervical radiculopathy, lumbar disc herniation, lumbar radiculopathy, chronic back pain, status post lumbar microdiskectomy and failed back syndrome. By all accounts, plaintiff enjoyed a good surgical outcome, and reported her pain was largely resolved just two weeks after surgery. Plaintiffs treating doctor stated that she had reached maximum medical benefit. She returned to work and remained employed for two years following the accident. Although she complained of debilitating pain, plaintiff had no medical restrictions on her, and she relied upon over-the-counter medications for pain relief. Plaintiff's medical expert found a decreased range of motion in all directions in her neck, but he did not identify the degree to which her range of motion was decreased, or how that resulted in the substantial loss of any bodily function. The court found that the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent loss of an bodily function under the language of the Torts Claims Act. Although it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove a total permanent loss of use of a bodily function, "a mere limitation on a bodily function" will not suffice. Similarly, "an injury causing lingering pain, resulting in a lessened ability to perform certain tasks because of the pain," is insufficient. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, finding that she failed to demonstrate any reduction in normal function that was both permanent and substantial. Although unreported and not precedential, this case is an example of the threshold of injury required under the Tort Claims Act. Even surgery may vault the requirement of a substantial and permanent injury. The court will examine how a plaintiff has recovered from injuries and to what extent residual impact there has been on life a person's function. Thanks to Heather Aquino Obregon for her contribution. For more information, contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com .   Previous Next Contact

News Insurance Coverage Granted for Restaurant’s Loss of Business Income Caused by COVID-19 May 28, 2021 < Back Share to: By way of brief background, in response to the spread of COVID-19, the Pennsylvania Governor issued mandates and orders that required all non-life sustaining businesses in Pennsylvania to cease operations and close physical locations, and citizens to stay at home. Due to these mandates and the spread of COVID-19, the plaintiff, Macmiles, LLC D/B/A Grant Street Tavern (“MacMiles”), suspended its business operations and submitted a claim to the defendant, Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”), under an all-risk ultra plus commercial general liability policy, which provides coverage for any direct physical loss or damage, unless the loss or damage is specifically excluded or limited by the policy. Erie denied MacMiles’ claim and, in response, MacMiles commenced a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment with respect to the policy’s business income protection, civil authority and extra expense provisions. Subsequently, MacMiles filed a motion for partial summary judgment and, in response, Erie filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. After oral argument, the court granted, in part, MacMiles’ partial summary judgment motion and denied Erie’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. First, the court granted MacMiles’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to MacMiles’ claim for declaratory judgment that MacMiles is entitled to coverage under the policy’s income protection provision. To make this determination, the court looked to the plain language of the policy and noted, to establish coverage under the provision, MacMiles must establish it suffered “direct physical loss of or damage to” its property. MacMiles argued a reasonable interpretation of the phrase “direct physical loss of . . . property” includes the loss of use of its property; whereas, in contrast, Erie argued this phrase requires some physical altercation of or demonstrable harm to MacMiles’ property. Focusing on the word “or”, the court reasoned the phrase “direct physical loss of” had a different meaning than the phrase “direct physical . . . damage to”. With this in mind, the court conducted an in-depth analysis to determine the meaning of the terms “damage” and “loss” as the policy did not define every term in the phrase “direct physical loss of or damage to” property. Citing to their common usage and dictionary definitions – as considered through the context of the policy and specific facts of the case – the court concluded the term “loss” reasonably encompasses the act of losing possession and/or deprivation, which includes the loss of use of property absent any harm to property, while “damage” encompasses all forms of harm to property. As such, the court held MacMiles’ loss of use of its property was “direct” and “physical” as the spread of COVID-19 had a close relationship to the way MacMiles utilized its property and physical space. In other words, the court held the spread of COVID-19 caused physical loss to MacMiles. In doing so, the court rejected Erie’s argument that the spread of COVID-19 merely imposed economic losses thereby clarifying that actual physical harm to property is not always required. The court also rejected Erie’s argument that the policy’s Amount of Insurance Provision is inconsistent with the interpretation that “direct physical loss of . . . property” encompasses MacMiles’ loss of use of its property absent tangible damage. The court held the policy’s Amount of Insurance provision does not necessitate the existence of damaged or destroyed property or require repairs, rebuilding or replacement of damaged or destroyed property to entitle MacMiles to coverage. Rather, the provision merely imposes a time limit on the available coverage, which ends when MacMiles’ business is operating at normal capacity after any required rebuilding, repairs or replacements are completed, or twelve (12) months after the initial date of the loss. In granting this component of MacMiles’ motion, the court also noted its disagreement with Erie’s argument that the policy’s compliance with laws and ordinance exclusion barred coverage as the court reasoned MacMiles’ sought coverage for losses suffered in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and the civil authority orders. In doing so, the court also stated, in a footnote, this exclusion could not have been intended to exclude coverage under the policy’s civil authority provision as it would make any extended coverage for the actions of civil authority illusory. Second, the court denied, without prejudice, MacMiles’ partial motion for summary judgment with respect to MacMiles’ claim for a declaration that the policy’s civil authority provision provides coverage for the losses MacMiles allegedly sustained as a result of the Governors’ orders to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Specifically, the court determined, unlike the income protection provision, the policy’s civil authority provision does not provide coverage for the loss of use of property other than MacMiles’ property. As such, the court determined, to establish coverage under the civil authority provision, MacMiles must demonstrate COVID-19 was actually present on property other than its own property, such damage occurred within one mile of its property and the Governors’ orders were “taken in response to dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage or continuation of the peril insured against that caused the damage, or the action is taken to enable a civil authority to have unimpeded access to the damaged property.” As the court determined genuine issues of material fact exist as to the foregoing elements, MacMiles’ motion was denied, in part. This decision is significant, as it seemingly provides plaintiffs with an avenue to obtain coverage for any losses sustained to their business as a result of COVID-19. Thanks to Lauren Berenbaum for her contribution to this post. Please contact Heather Aquino with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Motion to Change Venue Denied Despite Being Unopposed (NY) April 8, 2021 < Back Share to: In Francoise Mervil v. Eric Johnson and Marcia St. Urbain, Judge Francois A. Rivera denied Defendants’ unopposed motion to transfer venue because the only evidence in support of the Defendants’ motion constructed of inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff, Francoise Mervil (“Mervil”) commenced a personal injury action against the Defendants in Kings County Supreme Court, alleging Urbain was negligent in the operation of his vehicle so as to cause a collision with Mervil’s vehicle, severely injuring Mervil. The Defendants’ answer asserted improper venue as an affirmative defense and moved to change the venue from Kings County to Nassau County. In their motion, the Defendants argued that the venue was improper because Mervil did not maintain a residence in Kings County. However, the only evidence the Defendants provided in support of their argument was an uncertified police report. Despite the Defendants’ motion going unopposed, Judge Rivera denied the Defendants’ motion because the uncertified police report proffered by the Defendants was inadmissible and was the only evidence submitted to support their motion, thereby deeming the motion unsupported. Even if the Defendants certified the police report, making the exhibit now admissible evidence, Judge Rivera would have still denied their motion. Judge Rivera conveyed that an individual can be a resident of more than one county and a police report alone is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff does not reside in the county where he chose to commence the instant lawsuit. Thanks to Irving Fayman for his contribution to this article. For more information, please contact Tom Bracken. Previous Next Contact

News WCM Secures Favorable Outcome as Result of Chester County, PA Trial September 7, 2012 < Back Share to: Philadelphia, PA In the case of Modesta Ciarlone, et al. v. 271, L.P. et al., Modesta Ciarlone was heading to the Planet Fitness gym in Malvern, PA when she slipped and fell on black ice. As a result of her fall, she claimed she underwent three surgeries to her left hip – including a hip replacement. In her lawsuit, Ciarlone named the property owner, the gym and our client, the snow and ice contractor. The pre-trial demand on the case was $500,000. WCM partner Bob Cosgrove and associate Remy Cahn tried the case before the Honorable William Mahon, Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Chester County. After a four day trial and just before the jury got the case, the case settled for $250,000 or half of the plaintiff’s pre-trial bottom line demand. Previous Next Contact

News Plaintiff's Untimley Expert Disclosure Stricken in Westchester County (NY) March 5, 2019 < Back Share to: At a time when many counties tend to blur the CPLR, it is nice to know the rule of law still applies in Westchester County. The Second Department upheld a lower court decision to strike plaintiff’s untimely expert disclosure and deny plaintiff’s cross motion to amend her pleadings in Holder v. County of Westchester. Downstate counties are increasingly permitting post-note of issue discovery, however, the Supreme Court in Westchester correctly struck plaintiff’s post-note of issue expert disclosure upon defendant’s motion. Plaintiff was allegedly injured on December 13, 2009 while disembarking from a bus. Her original notice of claim, complaint, and bill of particulars were premised on the theory that the bus driver failed to lower the front of bus, causing plaintiff to fall when she disembarked. After the note of issue was filed, plaintiff served a supplemental response to defendants’ demand for expert disclosure wherein she added an additional theory of liability, namely, that the defendants allowed her to disembark from the bus in an area that contained ice which caused plaintiff to step on ice and fall. The plaintiff had already testified that she did not know of anything else that caused her to fall other than the height of the bus. The defendants moved to strike plaintiff’s supplemental responses and the plaintiff cross-moved to amend her pleadings. While courts generally allow plaintiffs to freely amend their pleadings, the Appellate Division found “where, as here, leave to amend is belatedly sought, judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly.” Changing a theory of liability so late in the game is extremely prejudicial and as such, the lower court correctly granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. While part rules in Kings and Queens County give plaintiffs ample opportunity to engage in post-note of issue discovery, it is refreshing to see a plaintiff appropriately held accountable for a tardy disclosure, which would have been prejudicial to the defendant. Thanks to Mehreen Hayat for her contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News GC's Right of Supervision Over Subcontractor Work is Key to Determination (PA) July 27, 2017 < Back Share to: On July 19, 2017, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed an order denying a motion to remove the entry of nonsuit as to Appellee Patrick Smiley, Jr. (“Smiley”), following a jury trial that resulted in a $501,107.41 verdict against Fairman’s Roof & Trusses, Inc. (“Fairman’s”). Smiley filed the underlying suit against Fairman’s after Fairman’s delivered bent trusses to a construction site where Smiley was the general contractor. These bent trusses were installed by Chris Fisher Construction (“Fisher”) and led to the collapse of a partially constructed pole barn. The collapse left Brian Baird trapped beneath four trusses and seriously injured him. Smiley alleged that Fairman’s breached their contract and warranty by delivering bent trusses. Fairman’s also filed a complaint to join Fisher as an additional defendant. In January 2013, Brian Baird and his wife commenced a separate civil action against Smiley and Fairman’s for products liability, negligent design, premises liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. Smiley also filed a cross-claim against Fisher alleging that Fisher was solely liable for the claims asserted by Appellants or was required to indemnify Smiley pursuant to an alleged indemnification agreement between the parties. The trial court bifurcated the appellants’ claims against Fisher from all claims of liability against Smiley and Fairman’s. In the trial against Smiley and Fairman’s, the trial court granted Smiley’s oral motion for nonsuit. The jury then returned a verdict in Appellants’ favor and against Fairman’s in the amount of $501,107.41. Appellants filed an appeal contending that the entry of nonsuit in favor of Smiley was improper prior to the presentation of evidence by all defendants. The Superior Court disagreed stating that Fairman’s indicated on the record that it was not taking a position on Smiley’s oral motion for nonsuit. Thus, Fairman’s lack of opposition suggested it did not intend to present evidence as to Smiley’s liability as part of its defense. In addition, Appellants had the opportunity to develop a case for liability during their case-in-chief which they failed to do. The court adhered to the general rule in Pennsylvania that a contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from work entrusted to a subcontractor unless the general contractor retained control or right of supervision over the performance of the work. Here, Smiley had hired Fisher based on Fisher’s experience in building pole barns and delegated the task of construction and supplying labor to him. Further, Smiley did not visit the job site and never made an attempt to supervise Fisher’s construction work. Thus, Fisher was in total control of the project and therefore Smiley was not responsible for the actions of Fisher. As a result, the Superior Court found no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in entering nonsuit in Smiley’s favor. Thanks to Garrett Gittler for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.   Previous Next Contact

News Plaintiff's Inconsistent Accident Accounts Were Fatal to His Claim (PA) September 19, 2019 < Back Share to: Recently in Yarweh v. Greyhound Lines, LLC, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2019) Plaintiff appealed an arbitration verdict, seeking a trial de novo. However, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment before that trial could be held. The Court found, among other reasons, that the Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements about the alleged slip and fall incident were both a genuine issue of material fact as well as a question of testimony credibility. Plaintiff was a passenger on the Greyhound buses, headed to Pittsburgh PA. It was raining during the trip and the bus made several stops where passengers boarded and exited the bus. When Plaintiff went to exit the bus at a later stop, he noticed that the aisle was wet, but did not note if the steps were also wet. He slipped and fell on the wet substance and was injured. Defendant moved for summary judgment for several reasons, one being that the the Plaintiff had three different sworn accounts for the slip and fall. Defendant argued that this created an absence of evidence to support the Plaintiff’s claim of negligence. The Court found that Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements were fatal to his claim, because “a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement ... without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). The Court also found that a Plaintiff “cannot simply ignore” a contradiction. Detz v. Greiner Indus., 346 F.3d 109, 116 (3rd Cir. 2003). Plaintiff failed to explain the discrepancies in several sworn accounts of the slip and fall, thus producing an issue of credibility and failing to prove negligence on behalf of Defendant. Furthermore, the Court stated that Plaintiff solely relied on circumstantial evidence of the wet steps, and did not prove that Defendant breached their duty of care. Consequently, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Thanks to Emily Finnegan for her contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Retired NY State Judges Will Be Able To Recertify After Being Forced To Step Off The Bench Due To COVID-19 May 6, 2021 < Back Share to: New York State Supreme Court justices who reach the mandatory retirement age of 70 will again be able to re-apply for their job and continue the bench. The New York State Constitution says judges must retire at the end of the year they reach age 70. The constitution allows for judges to recertify for a maximum of three two-year terms after proving that they’re still mentally and physically fit for the job. However, statewide budget cuts due to COVID-19 forced state agencies to shrink spending leading up to the 2021 fiscal year. More than $300 million was cut from the state’s judiciary budget, resulting in downsized operations and system-wide staff cuts. That included money to pay for retirement-age judges who wished to petition court administrators to serve additional terms. In November, a lawsuit was filed in Suffolk County by 46 out of 49 judges who were denied certification, claiming age discrimination, and that Judge DiFiore, Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, and the courts’ administrative board abused their discretion. Justice Paul Baisley Jr. struck down the decision by court administrators to deny the reappointment in December. In March, the Third Department ruled that New York court administrators had the constitutional authority to deny the judge's reappointment, which ultimately was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Despite the decision, Judge DiFiore announced that the judiciary budget recently passed by the state legislature will provide enough money to rehire the older judges, whose applications to serve beyond the age limit were denied because of the constraints prompted by COVID-19. The New York State Bar Association welcomed the decision. “The announcement by Chief Judge DiFiore will help our justice system run more smoothly and improve access to justice for lawyers and litigants,” said the group’s president, Scott Karson. Thanks to Irving Fayman for his contribution to this post. Should you have questions, please feel free to contact Thomas Bracken. Previous Next Contact

News Plaintiff’s Gets Tangled in a "Net Opinion" (NJ) May 3, 2018 < Back Share to: Expert reports can provide significant support for a party’s case- so long as the expert can provide the necessary support for his or her findings. The conclusory remarks in plaintiff’s expert report were challenged in Perdomo v. Orgacki, when plaintiff submitted an expert report that defendant claimed should be barred as a net opinion. In December 2010, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile involved in an accident. An MRI revealed that plaintiff sustained disc bulges that were attributable to the accident. Plaintiff’s expert, a chiropractor, had opined that there was some degree of permanency. Three years later, in November 2013, plaintiff was in a second accident, when she was rear-ended by an automobile driven by defendant. Subsequent MRIs revealed disc bulges in the same areas as found in her 2010 MRI results. The same chiropractor treated plaintiff for this subsequent accident, issuing a report that acknowledged his 2010 diagnosis of a low back injury with some degree of permanency. However, the doctor opined that plaintiff suffered further permanent partial impairment of her lower back that is 70% attributable to the 2013 accident. Defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish through credible objective medical evidence that she sustained a permanent injury because of the accident. In the alternative, defendant moved to bar plaintiff’s expert report as a net opinion. The trial court ultimately barred plaintiff’s expert report as a net opinion, leading to plaintiff’s appeal. The appellate court opined that an expert report must be grounded in facts or data derived from the expert’s personal observations, evidence admitted at trial, or data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence, but is normally relied upon by experts. The net opinion rule forbids admission of reports into evidence wherein an expert’s conclusions are not supported by factual evidence. Expert reports must give the why and wherefore of their opinions. Based on this analysis, the appellate court held that the trial court properly barred plaintiff’s expert report as a net opinion, as he failed to explain why the 2013 accident resulted in a partial impairment of plaintiff’s lower back. Thanks to Steve Kim for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Time to Start Monitoring Your Plaintiff’s Medications: An Accidental Overdose on Pain Medication Following an Accident Can Be Foreseeable. June 14, 2012 < Back Share to: In Rice v. West 37th Group, LLC, the decedent, an employee of Five Boro, was injured after falling 15 feet from a ladder. Two years after the accident, the decedent died, and the autopsy ruled the cause of death to be an accident due to intoxication combined with certain drugs. Essentially, the decedent overdosed. Five Boro, as the decedent’s employer, moved to dismiss the common-law contribution and indemnification claims on the basis that the decedent did not suffer a “grave injury.” In New York, Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 bars claims for common-law contribution and indemnification unless the plaintiff suffered a “grave injury.” Not surprisingly, death is one of the few injuries that qualify as “grave.” Five Boro argued that the decedent’s death was an extraordinary and unforeseeable occurrence that could not be attributed to the accident. The First Department disagreed, finding that the decedent suffered serious injuries, requiring him to take significant pain-killing drugs, each of which carried its own risks, and that plaintiff showed that the decedent was not abusing his medication. Given that, the Court held that there was an issue of fact as to whether the decedent’s death, caused by an overdose, was a foreseeable result of the accident. Special thanks to Gabe Darwick for his contributions to this post. For more information, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact