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- SuzanCherichetti | WCM Law
News PTSD Damages Not Permitted In Connecticut Underinsured Motorist Claim In The Absence Of Credible Expert Testimony June 16, 2023 < Back Share to: The Supreme Court of Connecticut recently issued a decision addressing the proof necessary to establish underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for certain damages claims. In Menard v. State, the Court evaluated whether plaintiffs were entitled to receive UIM benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from an auto accident. Plaintiffs in that case were state troopers who were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver and filed actions seeking UIM benefits from the State of Connecticut. The trial court issued judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, except as to their claims for PTSD damages. In doing so, the trial court found that the diagnosis and expert testimony of their expert was not credible and that the covered damages must be caused by “bodily injury”. Plaintiffs had argued that PTSD should be considered a “bodily injury” where plaintiffs have “physical manifestations” of PTSD. The trial court found that the plaintiffs’ PTSD claims were not due to physical injuries. The Appellate Court agreed and determined that the plaintiffs could not recover UIM benefits for PTSD. The Supreme Court agreed with this ruling but based its decision on different grounds. The Court instead found that plaintiffs’ expert witness was not credible and rejected the expert’s opinion that plaintiffs had PTSD. Thus, plaintiffs were not eligible to recover damages for PTSD, even if such coverage was afforded for such an injury under the UIM statute and the State of Connecticut’s UIM policy. The Court found that the trial court did not act arbitrarily in rejecting the expert opinion regarding PTSD and that this was a proper basis for determining UIM benefit eligibility. The Court also reversed the Appellate Court’s holding that the trial court should have reduced the award by the sums plaintiffs received to settle their Dram Shop claims. The Court recognized that the legislature abrogated the common-law rule regarding pretrial settlement payments when it adopted General Statute §52-216a. A trial court may reduce damages to account for pretrial settlement payments when the award would otherwise be excessive as a matter of law in the absence of such a reduction. The Court found that plaintiffs’ damages award was not excessive and that the Dram Shop settlement payments were not a “collateral source” to warrant a reduction. The Menard case highlights the importance of expert testimony in establishing causation and damages in UIM cases in Connecticut. The Court found that plaintiffs there failed to establish certain injuries even though they were potentially covered under the policy and applicable statute. Defendants should be prepared to challenge such claims where the proof is insufficient. Thank you to Arianna Arca for her contribution to this post. Please contact Andrew Gibbs with any questions. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News PA Court Finds UIM Benefits Not Required Under PA Umbrella Policies July 23, 2020 < Back Share to: In Jones v Amica Mutual Insurance, the Court recently considered whether an insurer was required to pay UIM benefits under a Personal Umbrella Policy. In the underlying action, Jones filed suit for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The adverse driver, Sean Murtha, was responsible for accident. Plaintiff received the $100,000 policy limit from Murtha's insurer Allstate. However, Jones claimed that her injuries exceeded this amount, and she subsequently filed an underinsured motorist claim with her own insurance carrier, Amica. At the time of the accident, Jones’ Umbrella Policy specifically excluded underinsured motorist coverage. Jones conceded that the Umbrella Policy excluded UIM benefits, but she argued that under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), Amica was required to offer her the opportunity to include UIM benefits in her Umbrella Policy, and because Amica failed to do so, the Umbrella Policy must be reformed to include UIM benefits up to the $1,000,000 policy limit. Under the MVFRL, every Pennsylvania motor vehicle liability insurance policy must provide UIM coverage unless the coverage has been explicitly waived by the named insured. See 75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §1731. Amica argued that, because the Umbrella Policy is an excess policy and not a motor vehicle liability policy, the MVFRL does not apply, and the Umbrella Policy cannot be reformed to include UIM coverage. The Court ultimately granted Amica’s motion to dismiss Jones’s claim for UIM benefits under the Umbrella Policy, finding that the MVFRL did not apply to the Umbrella Policy at issue. This case demonstrates the importance of verifying whether an Umbrella Policy provides UM/UIM coverage. Thanks to Emily Finnegan for her contribution to this post. Please contact Heather Aquino with any questions. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Caveat Employer—Coverage Triggered for Failure to Supervise July 11, 2018 < Back Share to: Although intentional acts are typically excluded from coverage under a commercial general or professional liability policy, an employer is still entitled to coverage in a claim for failure to supervise according to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Saint Frances Care Inc. For thirty years, from 1963 until 1993 when he retired in a cloud of suspicion, Dr. George Reardon sexually abused children in his care as an endocrinologist at St. Francis Hospital. The details and scale of his horrific actions came to light when, following his death in 1998, his home was purchased and the new home owners found a secret room housing pornographic materials and logs of his actions. Approximately 160 individuals sued the hospital for, among other things, corporate negligence, breach of fiduciary or confidential relationship, and breach of the special duty of care owed to children. The excess insurer of the hospital argued sexual assault falls outside the purview of coverage, and also raised concurrency and priority issues. The District of Connecticut rejected the excess insurer’s arguments, and the Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order. With respect to coverage for the sexual assault, the Second Circuit stated coverage is triggered under either the commercial general or professional liability at the primary level of coverage for the claims of failure to supervise. In reviewing claims, it can be difficult to separate the character of an action from the specific nature of a claim. In New York, the duty to defend arises when at least one claim fails within the scope of coverage. Here, it is incumbent to assess the nature of the claims against the actual insured, the hospital, to determine coverage. This matter sounds in negligent supervision, and negligence is typically covered. An important exception is when the character of an intentional act cannot be separated from the alleged negligence. We see this in cases where an assailant may not have intended injury, so the victim sues under an intentional tort and negligence (e.g., reckless disregard). As both causes of action pertain to the intentional act of an assault, coverage would be excluded even for the negligence action. By contrast, here, the intentional act is separate and apart from the hospital’s alleged negligence in failing to supervise the doctor. Thus, when analyzing claims arising from an intentional act, it is important to focus on two things: the character of the act itself, and whether the claim itself is removed from the act. Thanks to Christopher Soverow for his contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Three Families Can Count as Two for Labor Law’s Homeowner Exemption (NY) June 3, 2016 < Back Share to: Under New York Labor Law §§2401(1) and 241(6), a homeowner can be held vicariously liable for the torts of their contractors. However, the statute provides an exemption for the owners of one or two family homes who do not direct or control the work. But what counts as a family? The First Department recently shed some light that on issue in Diaz v Bocheciamp. In Diaz, the plaintiff’s decedent died after falling to the ground while working on the roof of the defendant’s house. The estate sued under New York Labor Law §§2401(1) and 241(6). At the time of the accident, the defendant homeowner shared the house with an adult child, two grandchildren, and a family friend who lived in the basement. The trial court had entered judgment against the homeowner, who appealed to the First Department. The First Department reversed, and held that the homeowner exemption applied. According to the court, the applicability of the exemption hinges on a “site and purpose” test, which is based on the homeowner’s intentions at the time of the injury. Because this defendant lived with relatives and collected no rent, the court held as a matter of law that this home was “at most, a two-family dwelling” even though it housed “three families, two of which are related.” Diaz is welcome news to homeowners who do not oversee their contractors’ work, but also to their insurers as well. Thanks to Michael Gauvin for his contribution. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News NJ "Substantial Factor" Sufficient Medical Causation Proof in Mesothelioma Suit April 7, 2010 < Back Share to: Mark Buttitta developed mesothelioma at age 49 years old and died a little more than one year later. In litigation filed on his behalf and pursued by his estate following his death, he alleged that he had been exposed to asbestos at a General Motors distribution warehouse where he worked as a "picker" filling orders for parts that included asbestos containing products. His direct exposure was limited to three summers and winter breaks during 1971-1973 when he was otherwise enrolled at Colgate University. He also claimed indirect exposure to asbestos fibers that his father and brother carried home from their work at GM. While a number of defendants in the case settled, two defendants proceeded to trial including Borg-Warner, a clutch supplier, and Asbestos Corp. Ltd, a Quebec supplier of raw asbestos to GM. The jury returned a verdict in excess of $30 Million dollars. At issue in the appeal was the legal standard of causation applied by the trial court. Generally a plaintiff in a product liability action must prove that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's control and that defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user. In a toxic tort product liability action, the plaintiff must also prove medical causation, e.g. exposure to the defendant's asbestos product caused an illness. For asbestosis and lung cancer cases, medical causation is proven on the basis of frequency, regularity, and proximity of exposure. However, the court noted testimony that mesothelioma can develop from the cumulative effects of only minimal or infrequent exposure thereby challenging the rigid application of the medical causation standard generally applied. Hence, the appellate court approved of the trial judge's application of a "substantial factor" test that required only that the plaintiff provide direct or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that at some point in his work history, Buttitta was exposed and in close proximity to the defendant's product frequently and on a regular basis. Although the defendants also challenged the trial court's denial of a remittitur, the appellate division found that the verdict was not so disproportionate that it shocked the judicial conscience. If you have any questions about this post, please email Denise Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com . See Buttitta v. Allied Signal at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a5263-07a5268-07.pdf Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Heir Files US Suit Against the Czech Republic to Recover Nazi Art May 31, 2012 < Back Share to: Michal Klepetar is the grand nephew of Richard Popper, a Jewish art collector who had a number of significant paintings seized by the Nazis. Many of the works -- valued at over $50 million -- are currently hanging in the Prague National Gallery, and it does not appear that Popper's ownership of the works are being questioned. But Czech restitution law only allows direct relatives, such as wives and children, to claim such stolen art, and his pleadings to government officials and politicians have fallen on deaf ears. As such, Klepetar is now trying his luck with the US courts, which in some cases have allowed Nazi art suits to proceed against foreign governments. Also of note is the fact that he is being represented by Edward Fagan, who has purchased an interest in the art works at issue and created an organization called Victims of Holocaust Art Theft for the specific purposes of the lawsuit. Fagan is well known for obtaining a billion dollar settlement from Swiss banks for withholding accounts that belonged to Jewish families that perished under the Nazis. Fagan later was accused of neglect, fraud, misappropriation and other ethics charges and apparently has been disbarred by New Jersey and New York. For more information, please write to Mike Bono at mbono@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News A Defendant Denied Summary Judgment for Hitting A Golf Ball Too Well (NY) June 6, 2019 < Back Share to: In New York, it is well-settled an individual who chooses to participate in a sport consents to certain risks which are inherent in the nature of the sport, a principle generally referred to as the Assumption of Risk doctrine. In golf, specifically, courts have explained that mishit golf balls flying in unintended directions fall within the scope of this doctrine, as such errors are a part of the game. However, in Krych v Bredenberg, the Fourth Department of the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion in a case where he struck plaintiff with a golf ball on a golf course. Bredenberg claimed his playing partners had teed off before him and plaintiff’s group was playing on the fairway 100 or 150 yards beyond where his partners’ drives had landed, and that his drive happened to be a particularly prodigious one and struck plaintiff. The Court found a question of fact and affirmed denial of summary judgment, as plaintiff’s testimony conflicted with defendant’s as to the distance of the shot at issue. Moreover, the Court observed Mr. Bredenberg was a very skilled golfer, the ball was struck straight and true, and plaintiff was visible to him, potentially within his range. The deposition testimony was key here, and while Assumption of Risk is a powerful defense tool, one must make sure discovery supports it if you are to plan for a successful summary judgment motion. And, ironically, Bredenberg would likely have been better off if he were a worse golfer and had simply shanked his drive. Thank you to Nicholas Schaefer for his contribution to this post. Please email Vito A. Pinto with any questions. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Terms Used in the Complaint Determine Defense Coverage to the Insured June 12, 2017 < Back Share to: In Hillcrest Coatings Inc v Colony Ins Co, the Appellative Division recently affirmed the trial court’s order requiring Colony Insurance provide a defense to its insured in an underlying environmental tort action despite the CGL policy’s hazardous materials exclusion. The allegations in the underlying environmental action stated that Hillcrest Coatings operated their glass and recycling facility in a negligent manner, causing hazardous materials to contaminate the surrounding areas. The underlying complaint also alleged that Hillcrest’s negligent actions “caused a malodorous condition to be created in the surrounding neighborhood.” In disclaiming coverage to Hillcrest, Colony relied upon an exclusion that excepts from coverage all bodily injury and property damage resulting from “actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘hazardous materials’ at any time.” ‘Hazardous materials’ was defined by the policy as “pollutants” including any “solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant…” The court found that ‘Malodorous’ is not necessarily ‘Hazardous,’ and Colony owed a duty to defend its insured. The Hillcrest decision serves to underscore the breadth courts attribute to the insurer’s duty to defend. The Court stated that Colony had failed to meet the high burden of establishing that the hazardous materials exclusion precluded coverage in this instance because, despite the fact that the underlying complaint specifically alleged that the “malodorous condition” resulted from hazardous materials, “foul odors are not always caused by the discharge of hazardous materials.” Thus, because “malodorous” may not be hazardous, Colony was ordered to provide a defense and to reimburse its insured for costs expended. This decision is a reminder that in terms of coverage, courts can find even an unlikely possibility of coverage to be “reasonable” when assessing the insurer’s duty to defend. Thanks to Vivian Turetsky for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News US Government Shutdown = More Contaminated Food? October 10, 2013 < Back Share to: Having spent some of the last week in London (between deposition prep sessions) talking to people about the US (and, yes, with apologies to my partner and friend Mike Bono I did use apocalyptic political language), one question that has come up is -- what effect does the shutdown (we'll leave the debt ceiling discussion for a later post) have on the business I underwrite? Well, at least for the product recall market, it appears that the answer is -- "significant." A chicken related salmonella outbreak has arisen in California and, it appears that, even if the release of contaminated product is not the result of a lack of government funding, the government's inability to respond may be. For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact
- Laina T. Goldwin | WCM Law
Laina T. Goldwin Associate Pennsylvania lgoldwin@wcmlaw.com Professional Experience Laina is an associate attorney in our Philadelphia office assisting with civil litigation for liability actions. Laina obtained her J.D. from American University Washington College of Law in Washington, D.C. Following her successful completion of law school, Laina clerked for the Hon. Benjamin Podolnick in Atlantic City. Prior to joining WCM, Laina worked as a family law attorney at a union side labor firm with offices in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Honors and Distinctions Summa cum Laude from Arizona State University News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., American University Washington College of Law B.A., Arizona State University Bar Admissions Pennsylvania New Jersey
- Rachel A. Wade | WCM Law
Rachel A. Wade Director of Human Resources New York rwade@wcmlaw.com +1 267 279 9926 Professional Experience As Director of Human Resources Rachel plans, leads, develops, coordinates, and implements policies, processes, training, initiatives, and surveys to support the organization's human resource compliance and strategy needs. Rachel collaborates with senior leadership to understand the organization's goals and strategy related to staffing, recruiting, and retention. She also serves as a key tactical partner in monitoring and ensuring the organization's compliance with federal, state, and local employment laws and regulations, and recommended best practices; and reviews and modifies policies and practices to maintain compliance. Rachel has spent her entire career at WCM, joining the firm in 1998 as a receptionist while studying at St. John’s University and then working as a legal assistant and paralegal before taking on the administrative and operational responsibilities that ultimately led to the transition to her role as Director of Human Resources. Honors and Distinctions St. John’s University, Bachelor of Science, cum laude News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education B.S., St. John's University
- AndyMilana | WCM Law
News Sports Injuries - Some Risks are Still Assumed (NY) March 10, 2017 < Back Share to: One piece of common sense courts tend to follow is that people usually assume the risks inherent in the games they play. Whether it’s a hockey player who might slip on the ice or a gymnast who might fall off the rings, people cannot expect to recover in a court of law just because they hurt themselves while playing a sport. Liability attaches when a property owner fails to correct risks outside the scope of a given activity. A recent First Department decision should provide a degree of comfort to property owners whose facilities host multiple sports. In Egbebemwen v. Nerw York City Department of Education, the plaintiff was a 15 year old boy who injured himself on a wrestling mat after trying to dunk a basketball. Though the mat was a few feet out of bounds, the plaintiff argued the defendant was negligent by leaving the mat so close to the court. The First Department rejected this argument, and held that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment, because the plaintiff was aware of the mat, and that it posed a tripping hazard. In other words, the risk was open and obvious. On a personal note, this facts pattern reminds me of a similar situation when I was a junior at Regis High School. While playing basketball, I sustained a high ankle sprain when my classmates and I neglected to move a small hockey goal from underneath the backboard in our lower gym. Predictably, I landed awkwardly on the goal and badly sprained my ankle. Adding insult to injury, I didn't secure the rebound. Ah, I can still hear the sympathetic cries of one of my classmates: "Sub! I'm in for Gibbons, he's down!" Men for Others, indeed. (No, there was no insurance claim or lawsuit. In fact, I think we were reprimanded for being careless and damaging the goal. The good ol' days.) Despite this decision, property owners should still take care to properly maintain their facilities. In Egbebemwen, the Court was careful to note that the Plaintiff had observed the dangerous conditions before. While a plaintiff who is aware of risk may be barred from recovery by assuming the risk, there may have been a different outcome if a newcomer to the facility had fallen to the mat. Thanks to Mike Gauvin for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact

