Janette Nweme-Singley Associate New Jersey jnwemesingley@wcmlaw.com 332.345.4072 Professional Experience Janette recently joined Wade Clark Mulcahy in the firm's New Jersey office. Prior to joining the firm, Janette worked at a mid-sized defense firm handling mass torts and asbestos defense litigation. In law school, Janette interned at a global pharmaceutical company working in compliance, commercial contracts, and commercial real estate alongside the Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary. Janette worked as a Student Attorney in the Rutgers Community & Transactional Lawyering Clinic handling corporate, small business, and nonprofit organization matters. Janette served as a federal judicial intern clerk for the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J. News I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Rutgers Law School B.A. in Political Science and Legal Studies, William Paterson University Bar Admissions New York

News Superior Court of Pennsylvania Finds Coverage for Gunfight December 1, 2017 < Back Share to: The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Erie Insurance Exchange in Erie’s action for a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify the Estate of Harold Eugene McCutcheon, Jr. in a personal injury action filed by Richard Carly. In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Tracy L Moore and Harold E. McCutcheon, III, individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Hard Eugene McCutcheon, Jr. and Richard Carly, on September 26, 2013, Harold McCutcheon went to the home of his former wife, Terry L. McCutcheon, killed her, and then committed suicide. Before McCutcheon killed himself, Richard Carly arrived unexpectedly at the home, struggled with McCutcheon, and was seriously injured by shots fired from McCutcheon’s gun. Erie contended that the homeowners’ policies it issued to McCutcheon did not cover Carly’s injuries because McCutcheon inflicted them intentionally. Carly contended that, as alleged in his complaint against McCutcheon’s Estate, the discharge of the gun and resulting injuries were unintentional, and Erie therefore was required to provide a defense and indemnity. The Superior Court assessed how the policies’ terms applied to infliction of a gunshot wound during an altercation between two participants. Despite agreeing with Erie that the repeated descriptions of McCutcheon’s conduct in Carly’s complaint as “negligent” and “careless” were merely “artful pleading” and not determinative, the Superior Court decided to reverse the Trial Court because the facts as alleged set forth a claim that McCutcheon accidentally shot Carly while he waived around his gun during their struggle. Specifically, the facts alleged a chaotic brawl in which McCutcheon fired his gun wildly while trying to fight Carly off. In reaching its conclusion that the alleged events fit the policies’ definitions of a covered “occurrence,” rather than conduct deliberately intended to inflict harm, the Superior Court distinguished this case from the willful assault cases, noting that no one knows what McCutcheon was thinking that night and that facts. The Superior Court’s holding in this matter provides important insight regarding the waning applicability of the intended harm exclusion in personal injury cases. It appears that courts are analyzing complaints with increasing scrutiny in an effort to find coverage. Thanks to Hillary Ladov for her contribution to this post.     Previous Next Contact

News NJ Supreme Court Declines to Extend Landlord’s Common Law Duty in the Absence of Any Regulatory Violations (NJ) September 5, 2019 < Back Share to: In J.H. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether liability should be imposed on a landlord based on a theory of regulatory responsibility over an apartment building’s heating system, or based on a new common law duty to cover an apartment unit’s radiator with insulating materials. The case dealt with a 9 month old who sustained burns from coming into contact with a radiator inside the parents’ apartment. The radiator, which was not insulated, could have been shut off by the tenants, but they could not control the temperature. One of the parents was charged with and pled guilty to 4th degree child abuse/neglect for placing a 9 month old in a bed with no rails and for leaving the baby with his sister who was 10. Nonetheless, the mother tried to sue the landlord on the theory that the landlord had a duty to provide a safe apartment pursuant to the State’s Multiple Apartment Dwelling regulations. Those regulations state that parts of the “heating system” must be insulated. The regulations also provide a list of items included within the “heating system” such as risers, ducts and hot water lines, but the list did not include radiators as being part of the heating system which must be insulated. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, finding that the radiator is not part of the heating system which must be insulated, as well as finding that the landlord, who was heavily regulated and who was subject to routine inspections, was never given a violation for failing to provide covers for the radiators inside each apartment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the regulatory scheme encompassed radiators as being part of the heating system, although no such express intent was included within the regulations. The Appellate Division further held that a jury should have been allowed to assess whether the landlord breached its common law duty of care to provide a reasonably safe dwelling. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and upheld the trial court’s dismissal on summary judgment. First, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded that the “heating system” included radiators as there was no such legislative intent. Instead, it was clear that pipes and ducts had to be insulated, but not radiators. The Court also declined to extend a landlord’s duty of care to provide radiator covers, especially since the landlord was in compliance with all applicable regulations. This case is a good illustration of how compliance with regulations can get lead to a dismissal, on a dispositive motion, without the need for a lengthy trial that could allow a jury to find liability despite there being no unlawful conduct. Thank you to Michael Noblett for his contribution to this post. Please email Colleen E. Hayes with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Third Circuit Rejects Policyholder Claims Where Pennsylvania’s UIM Coverage Rejection Requirements Are Satisfied November 4, 2022 < Back Share to: Uninsured and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage is not mandatory in Pennsylvania and insureds have the option of rejecting such coverage by signing an approved form. In Keeler v. Esurance Insurance Services, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently addressed whether a waiver of UIM coverage by insureds was void to permit them to maintain claims against their motorcycle insurer. Plaintiff Nathan Keeler suffered serious injuries when his motorcycle collided with an SUV which had pulled out of an intersection. The SUV driver’s insurer settled for the bodily injury limit of $300,000 but Keeler claimed injuries in excess of that amount and sought to recover UIM benefits from their insurer Esurance. The claim was denied on the basis that plaintiff had signed a rejection form waiving UIM coverage and had consistently not paid premiums for such coverage. Plaintiffs sued various Esurance entities, claiming breach of contract and bad faith denial of insurance coverage. They sought damages exceeding $75,000 and Esurance removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Esurance moved for summary judgment, arguing that it properly denied the claim for UIM benefits based upon plaintiffs’ signed waiver. Plaintiffs cross-moved on the grounds that the waiver was void because Esurance failed to print it in a “prominent type and location” as per Pennsylvania law. They also claimed that because Esurance’s renewal notices did not mention UIM protection, also required by Pennsylvania law, that the waiver was void. The District Court disagreed and held that the UIM rejection form was valid and that there was no civil remedy for defective renewal notice under Pennsylvania law. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the UIM rejection form satisfied the prominent-type-and-location requirement under Pennsylvania law. The court observed that the form was included on a separate document from the policy itself, was organized by subject matter, with the waiver in its own section in a readable sized font with a bold, underlined title in all capital letters, with a signature line that was signed by plaintiff. The court also held that while Esurance violated Pennsylvania’s renewal form prominence requirement, Pennsylvania law does not provide for a civil remedy for such deficiencies. Thus, Esurance’s violation did not affect the validity of the UIM waiver. The Keeler decision highlights the importance of insurer compliance with Pennsylvania’s UIM rejection form requirements and supports a denial of UIM coverage where the requirements are met, and insureds waive such coverage. Thank you to Haley Matthes for her contribution to this post. Please contact Andrew Gibbs with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News NJ App. Div. Interprets Retroactive Period In Claims Made PL Policy And Professional Services In Occurrence CGL Policy- Finds No Coverage For Either. December 22, 2011 < Back Share to: In Cumberland County Guidance Center ( CCGC) v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. , CCGC sought coverage for allegations of its employees failure to report alleged sexual abuse under a claims made professional liability policy and an occurrence commercial general liability policy, both issued by Scottsdale. The trial court found coverage under the PL policy, and no coverage under the CGL policy. Appeals followed. The Appellate Division affirmed no coverage under the CGL policy, reversed the finding of coverage under the PL policy and found that Scottsdale had no duty to defend. The panel rejected the argument that the failure to report sexual abuse was a continuing tort in an attempt to bring the claim within the policy’s retroactive period. It found that the policy clearly stated that there was no coverage for any wrongful act or omission that was committed before the retroactive period. Additionally, the panel held that the failure to report alleged sexual abuse arose out of the rendering or failure to render professional services , finding a substantial nexus between the context in which the acts were complained of occurred and the professional services performed. Please contact Robert Ball with any questions regarding this post at rball@wcmlaw.com . http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4591-08a4817-08.pdf Previous Next Contact

News PA Court Finds No Coverage for Sandusky Claims March 7, 2013 < Back Share to: Legal issues and case law continue to emerge from the Jerry Sandusky matter. The Second Mile, a charitable organization run by Sandusky, submitted a claim to its Directors and Officers insurance carrier. As we previously posted, The Second Mile’s insurer, Federal Insurance Company, has been vigorously opposing Sandusky’s claims that it owes him any coverage for the underlying civil and criminal litigation. Although the Middle District of Pennsylvania previously denied Federal’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Judge Yvette Kane recently granted Federal’s summary judgment motion. Judge Kane held that Federal was not obligated to cover Sandusky’s legal fees since Sandusky’s crimes did not take place in his capacity as an employee or executive of the charity, a standard required by the applicable Federal policy. In fact, Judge Kane explained that the fact that Sandusky met and allegedly abused victims “during the course of activities of Second Mile” does not impart a duty on Federal because Sandusky’s abuse of the children was “personal in nature, and performed in his individual capacity.” Sandusky opposed the motion and requested additional time for discovery to review Federal’s claims files, its underwriting manuals and other Federal policies that Federal used to exclude sex abuse or molestation from coverage. Judge Kane denied this request on the basis that subsequent discovery “will not alter the court’s conclusion that the Federal policy does not cover the acts in question.” As this case proceeds, WCM will continue to provide updates on the court’s decisions. Thanks to Remy Cahn for her contribution to this post. If you would like more information please write to mbono@wmclaw.com   Previous Next Contact

News WCM Published in Pennsylvania Defense Institute’s Publication, CounterPoint, on Statute of Limitations February 13, 2020 < Back Share to: WCM Partner, Bob Cosgrove, and associate, Lauren Berenbaum, recently published an article entitled Recent Changes to PA’s Statute of Limitations Sparks Coverage Questions in CounterPoint, Pennsylvania Defense Institute’s official publication (article on p. 9 -11.) The article discusses the current landscape of Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations, and how recent Pennsylvania legislation provides victims of childhood sexual abuse more time to file civil lawsuits. Since Pennsylvania, unlike many other states, has not enacted legislation providing a universal civil window of two years to revive previously expired claims, Bob and Lauren also evaluate how the courts in Pennsylvania may be filling that void by permitting claims based in fraud and conspiracy to proceed against the Pennsylvania Dioceses. In doing so, the article raises numerous questions about the type of litigation that may be commenced against the Pennsylvania Dioceses. Finally, as the title also indicates, Bob and Lauren explore the potential coverage implications, such as whether the Pennsylvania Dioceses will be able to turn to their commercial general liability policies for defense and indemnity. Please email Bob or Lauren with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Knowledge of Leaky Air Conditioner Insufficeint to Establish Notice of Presence of Mold November 7, 2008 < Back Share to: In Litwack v. Plaza Realty, the plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apartment building, brought suit to recover for injuries allegedly sustained due to toxic mold in her apartment. When the plaintiff began to feel sick, her doctors recommended that she have her apartment environmentally tested and the presence of mold was confirmed. Months before the mold was discovered, the plaintiff had complained about a brown, wet spot in the middle of her dining room wall. A week later, the building's handyman opened the sheetrock and discovered a potential tiny crack in a steam pipe. When the steam was turned on months later, the crack was confirmed and a plumber was called in to repair the pipe. The plaintiff had also complained that her air conditioners dripped during the summer months. In response, building staff would change her filters from time to time. Based on these two incidents, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants were on notice of the mold. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the defendants did not have sufficient notice of the potential for mold growth. Litwack v. Plaza Realty Investors, 208 WL 4700971 (N.Y.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 08158 Previous Next Contact

News Plaintiff Fails to Slip by Black Ice Case (NY) December 20, 2013 < Back Share to: In Andrew Cuillo v. Fairfield Property Services, L.P., the Appellate Division affirmed the general rule regarding “black ice” in premises liability cases. When plaintiff testified that he did not see any snow or ice on the ground before the accident even though he looked down, the trial court granted (and the Second Department affirmed) defendant’s summary judgment motion. The Appellate Division reiterated that the property owner has a duty to clear snow and ice only when it created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition. In addition, the Second Department affirmed the trial court’s decision not to consider the affidavits of plaintiff’s experts who had not been previously identified. Thanks to Allison Weintraub for her contribution to this post. If you have any questions, please email Paul at pclark@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News What is "Lawful Possession" of a Vehicle? August 8, 2018 < Back Share to: The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently analyzed the circumstances under which an insured is in “possession” of a vehicle for coverage purposes. In State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dooner, Dooner, the passenger, grabbed the steering wheel of the vehicle, while Fonte, the driver, was driving, causing the vehicle to strike a police car. Fonte and the police officer commenced lawsuits against Dooner. Dooner sought coverage for the lawsuits under his State Farm Policy. State Farm commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that its policy did not provide coverage to Dooner for the lawsuits. The trial court granted State Farm summary judgment. On appeal, Fonte argued the State Farm Policy provided coverage for a “non-owned” vehicle if that vehicle was in the “lawful possession” of the insured. Fonte argued Dooner was in possession of Fonte’s vehicle, at the time of the accident, because Dooner had grabbed the wheel of the vehicle that caused the accident. In analyzing this argument, the court noted the State Farm Policy did not define the term “possession”. As such, the court looked to the surrounding facts. The court reasoned that the driver, Fonte, at all times relevant, was in the driver seat and never relinquished control of the gas or brake pedals. Additionally, the court also noted other jurisdictions had previously held a passenger grabbing a steering wheel did not constitute possession. Consequently, the court agreed with the trial court and held there was no coverage under the State Farm Policy because Dooner never was in “possession” of the vehicle. Accordingly, this case offers some insight into the relevant facts a court may look to when analyzing whether an insured is in possession of a vehicle for purposes of coverage under an automobile policy. Thanks to Colleen Hayes for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News MTA Cannot Avoid Liability Under Emergency Doctrine (NY) September 22, 2023 < Back Share to: In Greene v. MTA Bus Co. 2023 NY Slip Op 04658, (September 20, 2023) plaintiff brought action against the MTA, and another motorist, when plaintiff sustained injuries caused by the sudden stop of the bus she was riding on. The facts here appeared clear cut as Plaintiff was riding an MTA bus on Hillside Avenue in Queens. When the bus was pulling away from the pickup stop, the co-defendant made a right turn directly into the path of the bus causing the bus driver to make a sudden stop. At summary judgment, MTA moved under the emergency doctrine, arguing they were faced with sudden and unexpected circumstances not of the driver’s own making, leaving the driver no time for reflection and that the driver is compelled to make a quick decision without weighing any alternative courses of conduct. Yet, both the lower court and the Second Department denied the MTA’s motion for summary judgment finding the MTA failed to eliminate their driver was not at fault for the accident, and that there were still questions of fact as to whether the driver exercised reasonable care to avoid the accident, or if his actions were contributing to the emergency. This case highlights the importance introducing the testimony that affirms your client’s “innocence.” Eliminating potential issues of fact, especially in situations where there is incentive to leave things open for interpretation, is imperative to get a court to grant summary judgment motions. Thanks to Chris Palmieri for his assistance with this article. Should you have any questions, please contact Tom Bracken. Previous Next Contact

News NJ – Don’t Drink and Operate a Private Water Craft October 12, 2018 < Back Share to: The Appellate Division recently held that the Dram Shop Act does not apply to a tavern hosting a small party where the guests, who were employees of the tavern, brought their own alcohol to the party. The Dram Shop Act was designed to protect the rights of persons who suffer loss as a result of the negligent service of alcohol by a licensed alcoholic beverage server. In Votor-Jones v. Delly, plaintiff was one of seven employees and patrons of Kelly’s Tavern invited on a social trip organized by the tavern’s owner. The guests brought with them four or five coolers of alcohol on two boats. One guest, Michelle, started drinking before they got on the boat. Michelle continued to drink alcohol after the boats departed for the ocean. Other guests described Michelle as “loud”, “boisterous” and “excited,” but they conceded that they did not know whether she was intoxicated. After stopping the boats, Michelle was allowed to operate Kelly’s boat. Michelle sped away, but turned back toward the other boat at a speed of 40mph. Michelle then struck plaintiff who was swimming in the ocean. To prevail on a Dram Shop Act Claim, a party must present evidence that an establishment served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. The Appellate Division rejected as “too attenuated” plaintiff’s contention that the circumstances fell within the scope of the Dram Shop Act because neither Kelly’s Tavern nor Kelly individually were acting as a “licensed alcoholic beverage server” or “server” completed by the statute. Moreover, Michelle was not a “customer” of Kelly’s Tavern or Kelly. The Court summarized the outing as an informal, small-scale get together that required attendees to bring their own food and alcohol. Although there are many instances where an individual is “served” alcohol, not every instance will give rise to liability if that person injures another after imbibing alcohol. Small get-togethers hosted by a tavern where guests bring their own alcohol will not subject a tavern to liability, but the Court acknowledged that a more large scale party for employees where alcohol is provided to them would result in liability to the tavern. Thanks to Michael Noblett for his contribution to this post.     Previous Next Contact